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In Defense of Feres: An Unfairly Maligned Opinion
Abstract

The Supreme Court’s 1950 Feres v. United States decision held that when it enacted the Federal Tort Claims
Act Congress did not intend to waive sovereign immunity for injuries to members of the military arising out of
activity incident to their service. The Court’s decision was influenced by the long history of efforts to enact a
general tort claims bill that would free Congress from the burden of processing claims against the government,
as well as the case law, statutes, and procedures pertaining to service-members’ injuries prior to enactment of
the Federal Tort Claims Act. This Article examines those influences and the early cases that analyzed the
incident to service issue under the Act, including the Court’s Brooks decision that allowed service-member
suits for injuries that did not arise incident to service. The Article reviews the lower courts’ decisions in the
three cases that were consolidated in Feres and the parties’ briefing in the Supreme Court. The Article
addresses arguments that have been raised against Feres’ reasoning, arguments that independently attack its
holding, and various characterizations of the opinion. Because of the language of the Federal Tort Claims Act,
the historical backdrop to the Court’s decision, and the absence of any indication that Congress intended to
waive sovereign immunity for injuries suffered incident to service, Feres correctly decided that the Federal
Tort Claims Act did not encompass such injuries.
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INTRODUCTION
In its 1950 Feres v. United States1 opinion, the Supreme Court
considered three companion Federal Tort Claims Act (―FTCA‖ or ―the
Act‖)2 cases involving claims of military members arising from injuries
that occurred while they were on active duty.3 The Court concluded that
Congress had not intended to include such claims in the Act‘s general

1. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
2. Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (establishing an administrative procedure for tort claims
against federal agencies and granting United States district courts jurisdiction to hear such
claims, subject to specific exceptions and jurisdictional exclusions).
3. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949); Griggs v. United States,
178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949); Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949).
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waiver of sovereign immunity.4 Accordingly, it held that, ―the Government
is not liable under the . . . Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries
arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.‖5 In practice,
this means that members of the military cannot sue the government in tort
for injuries related to their military service.
Judges, bar associations, attorneys, and academics have severely
criticized the Feres decision. The Court is accused of willfully ignoring a
straight-forward statute6 by creating an exception to the FTCA that
Congress deliberately rejected.7 It is charged that Feres ―and its progeny
have wrought untold injustice.‖8 In sum, according to this school of
thought, ―[g]iven the absence of historical or legal support, the Feres
doctrine appears to be the product of little more than judicial lawmaking.‖9
The burden of this Article is to show that the Supreme Court correctly
decided the Feres case in 1950. Part I reviews the historical and legal
backdrop to Feres. It discusses the considerations and decades-long
legislative efforts that led to the enactment of the FTCA. It then evaluates
the four mechanisms through which service members sought financial
relief for service-connected injuries prior to enactment of the FTCA. The
uniform compensation system Congress established for service members
and veterans provided substantial benefits. Tort litigation under pre-FTCA
statutes that waived sovereign immunity, however, was unsuccessful
because those statutes were held to exclude claims of service members who
had a Congressionally-provided administrative remedy. The Military

4. The Feres opinion concludes, ―We do not think that Congress, in drafting this Act,
created a new cause of action dependent on local law for service-connected injuries or death
due to negligence. We cannot impute to Congress such a radical departure from established
law in the absence of express congressional command.‖ 340 U.S. at 146.
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 875 (9th Cir. 2001) (Ferguson, J.,
dissenting) (―[T]he only conceivable reason for the Court to engage in re-writing of such a
momentous statute was that it believed that Congress had not given enough protection to the
government against the men and women in the armed forces.‖).
7. See, e.g., ABA & BAR ASS‘N OF D.C., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 12
(2008) (―The Court—almost 60 years ago—wrote into the FTCA an additional exception
that Congress could have added but deliberately did not.‖). The American Bar Association
approved Recommendation 10(b), which urged ―Congress to examine the ‗incident to
service‘ exception to the [FTCA] created by the Supreme Court in Feres . . . [and] provide
that only the exceptions specifically provided in the Act limit active duty military members‘
access to the courts.‖ 2008 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND
MEETING
OF
THE
HOUSE
OF
DELEGATES
11
(2008),
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2008/annual/docs/select_committee_report.doc.
8. Kevin J. Barry, A Face Lift (and Much More) for an Aging Beauty: The Cox
Commission Recommendations to Rejuvenate the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 2002
MICH. ST. L. REV. 57, 119–20 (2002).
9. Jonathan Turley, Pax Militaris: The Feres Doctrine and the Retention of Sovereign
Immunity in the Military System of Governance, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2003).

PAUL FIGLEY 60.2

396

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:393

Claims Act and the Military Personnel Claims Act authorized and paid
administrative settlements to service members for various tort claims, but
not for ―injury or death occur[ring] incident to their service.‖10
Congressionally-enacted private laws for the benefit of individual injured
service members did not produce compensation because few such bills
were passed by Congress, and those that did were vetoed.
Part II analyzes the key, pre-Feres judicial opinions that addressed
whether service members could sue under the FTCA. It examines two
seminal opinions by U.S. District Judge William Chesnut, the first rejecting
the government‘s argument that the FTCA did not apply to suits arising
from military service and the second granting dismissal on that basis. It
analyzes the district court and Fourth Circuit opinions in the Brooks
litigation, and the parties‘ briefing of that case before the Supreme Court.
It reviews the Court‘s 1949 Brooks decision which held that service
members could sue under the FTCA for injuries not incurred incident-toservice.11 Finally, it summarizes the three circuit court opinions12 that
raised the common issue the Court resolved in Feres: whether the FTCA
provides a remedy for injuries arising incident to military service.13
Part III reviews the Supreme Court proceedings in Feres.
It examines the government‘s Supreme Court briefs and those of the three
plaintiffs. It summarizes the Court‘s Feres decision. To provide a
background for considering the criticisms of the decision that ensued, it
briefly reviews the Court‘s subsequent, related opinions.
Part IV considers the Feres opinion and the criticisms leveled against it.
It evaluates the Feres opinion and the reasoning supporting the Court‘s
conclusion that Congress did not intend for the FTCA to apply to injuries
that arose incident to military service. It examines criticisms that directly
challenge Feres‘ reasoning, including arguments that the FTCA does not
require parallel private person liability, that state tort law can properly be
used in service member suits despite the federal relationship between them
and the government, and that the Court misjudged the importance of the
military compensation system to the FTCA. It also examines two
criticisms that independently attack Feres‘ holding. The first argues that
earlier drafts of the FTCA included an exception for claims of service
members that was not included in the Act; the second asserts that Feres
10. Military Personnel Claims Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-67, 59 Stat. 225 (1946)
(codified with some difference in language in 1946 at 31 U.S.C. § 223b, now codified at 10
U.S.C. §§ 2731–39 (2006)).
11. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 50–51 (1949).
12. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir 1949); Griggs v. United States,
178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949); Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949).
13. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950).
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undermines the deterrence aspect of tort law. Finally, Part IV considers
labels that have been pinned onto the Feres opinion—that it judicially
created an extra exception to the FTCA, that it usurped the role of
Congress, and that it fostered injustice.
The Article concludes with an appraisal of the logical consequences of
the Feres holding. These include the limited authority of the Feres
decision outside its FTCA context, the importance of the rationales of the
decision in deciding whether the FTCA or other areas of the law provide a
financial remedy to service-members, and whether the Feres holding can
be altered by the judiciary.
I.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE FERES DECISION

A. Sovereign Immunity and Enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act
The doctrine of sovereign immunity, as it is understood in American
jurisprudence, provides that a sovereign state can be sued only to the extent
that it has consented to be sued and that only its legislative branch can give
such consent.14 Unless Congress has enacted an applicable waiver of the
United States‘ sovereign immunity, the federal government cannot be sued
for
damages.15
―A waiver of the Federal Government‘s sovereign immunity must be
unequivocally expressed in statutory text, . . . and will not be
implied . . . .‖16 Accordingly, no one could sue the United States in tort
until Congress passed a statute waiving the government‘s sovereign
immunity for such a suit.17 The Federal Tort Claims Act provided such a
general waiver for tort cases when it became law in 1946.18

14. See, e.g., United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 610 (1990) (stating that the principle
that power to consent is reserved to Congress is central to our understanding of sovereign
immunity); accord United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940)
(―Consent alone gives jurisdiction to adjudge against a sovereign. Absent that consent, the
attempted exercise of judicial power is void. . . . Public policy forbids the suit unless
consent is given, as clearly as public policy makes jurisdiction exclusive by declaration of
the legislative body.‖).
15. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (―Thus, except as Congress has
consented to a cause of action against the United States, ‗there is no jurisdiction
. . . in any . . . court to entertain suits against the United States.‘‖ (quoting United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 587–88 (1941))); United States v. McLemore,
45 U.S. 286, 288 (1846) (―[T]he government is not liable to be sued, except with its own
consent, given by law.‖); see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 411–12 (1821) (―The
universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the
United States; that the judiciary act does not authorize such suits.‖).
16. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (citing United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc.,
503 U.S. 30, 33–34, 37 (1992); Irwin v. Dep‘t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990));
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. at 514.
17. See Lane, 518 U.S. at 192 (stating that the ability to sue the United States relies
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American citizens have a First Amendment right to petition the
government for redress of grievances.19 From the beginning of the
Republic, individuals have used that right to seek special private legislation
granting them financial remedies for damages caused by the government,
including tort damages.20 Also from the beginning, members of Congress
recognized that legislation was a poor way to resolve private claims against
the government. On February 23, 1832, John Quincy Adams wrote:
There is a great defect in our institutions by the want of a court of
Exchequer or Chamber of Accounts. [Deciding claims] is judicial
business, and legislative assemblies ought to have nothing to do with it.
One-half of the time of Congress is consumed by it, and there is no
common rule of justice for any two of the cases decided. A deliberative
assembly is the worst of all tribunals for the administration of justice.21

By the twentieth century, the legislative process had proven particularly
ill-suited to resolving tort claims.22 The process was subject to inordinate
delays and arbitrary actions.23 Congressional procedures were inadequate
to the task of promptly and effectively resolving tort claims on their merits.
upon statutory authority).
18. Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Paul Frederic Kirgis, Section 1500 and the Jurisdictional
Pitfalls of Federal Government Litigation, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 301, 302 (1997) (citing
WILSON COWEN ET AL., THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS, A HISTORY, PART II:
ORIGIN-DEVELOPMENT-JURISDICTION, 1855–1978, at 9 (1978)).
20. See Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
77th Cong. 49–55 (1942) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463]; James E.
Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and
Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 20, 23 (forthcoming
2010), http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/faculty-workshops/pfander.paper.pdf
21. Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 49. On December 18,
1854, Senator Broadhead of Pennsylvania similarly stated:
[O]ne third of the [Senate‘s] time, to say nothing of the time spent by committee—
is set apart for the consideration of private bills . . . . Our time is too valuable to be
occupied in discussing the merits or demerits of a private bill. Frequently, we
dispute about the facts of a case presented in an ex parte way, the truth of which
could be better ascertained by a tribunal differently constituted.
Id.
22. In 1926, the House of Representatives procedure for enacting such a private bill
called for the claim to be referred to the Committee on Claims. H.R. REP. NO. 69-667, at 13
(1926) (Supplementary Report of Congressman Emanuel Celler), cited in Hearings on H.R.
5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 50–51. If the committee took favorable action, the
claim would be forwarded to the House where it would be placed on the Private Calendar.
Id. Any member could strike it from that calendar for any reason. Id.
23. See id. (stating that the Committee on Claims could meet for a century and still not
adjudicate all pending claims). In 1926, Congressman Charles Underhill of Massachusetts
said, ―The power vested in the chairman of the Committee on Claims is tremendous and
absolutely wrong. I can either refuse arbitrarily to consider your claim or I can take up each
and
every
one
of
your
claims
to
suit
my
convenience.‖
67 CONG. REC. 7527 (1926), cited in Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20,
at 52.
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In 1926 Congressman Celler explained that the ―Committee on Claims
ha[d] no facilities nor ha[d] the members time or inclination to pass upon
questions of negligence and contributory negligence, to sift evidence, and
determine a host of matters.‖24 Witnesses were not cross-examined.25
The process imposed substantial burdens on the time and attention of
Congress.26 Narrow waivers of sovereign immunity did become law, as
then Assistant Attorney General Francis M. Shea explained in 1942 when
he presented the Administration‘s detailed recommendation for what
became the Federal Tort Claims Act:
[T]he ban upon suits against the Government [was] lifted in certain cases
sounding in tort. . . . During the [F]irst World War, when the
Government took over operation of the railroads and other utilities,
Congress made the United States subject to the same responsibility for
property damage, personal injury, and death as the private owners
themselves would have been. A few years later, in 1920 and 1925, the
Government consented to suits in the district courts upon admiralty and
maritime torts involving Government vessels, without limitation as to
amount.27

These statutes did not significantly stanch the number of private bills. In
1926, the House Committee on Claims favorably reported a general tort
claims bill, largely because of the burden private claims imposed on
Congress.28 The committee noted that in the previous Congress (the 68th),
more than two thousand private bills were introduced, but only 250 were
enacted.29 It explained that ―[m]embership on the Committee on Claims
ha[d] become a nearly intolerable burden, not only because of the number
of claims submitted but because of the realization that careful judicial
consideration of the claims [wa]s for the most part impossible.‖30
24. H.R. REP. NO. 69-667, at 14 (Supplementary Report of Congressman Emanuel
Celler), cited in Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 51. Congressman
Ross Collins of Mississippi testified that, ―I made up my mind that Congress was wasting its
time in playing around with these comparatively minor private bills, and that the
consideration given to them by the individual membership was trifling.‖ A General Tort
Bill:
Hearing
Before
a
Subcomm.
of
the
Comm.
on
Claims,
72d Cong. 6 (1932), cited in Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 53.
25. Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 54 (statement of
Congressman Robison).
26. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 49–55 (collecting
criticisms from various legislators that the private bill process is cumbersome, inefficient,
and burdensome); S. REP. NO. 79-1400, at 30–31 (1946) (noting that thousands of private
bills were introduced and hundreds were approved); H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 2 (1945)
(same).
27. Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 24.
28. See H.R. REP. NO. 69-667, at 1–2 (stating that the purpose of the bill is to ease the
burden on Congress), cited in Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 50.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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In 1931, the House Committee on Claims issued a similar report on
another tort claims bill, noting the continued ―burden on Congress and the
injustice to claimants, because of the lack of facilities for proper and
adequate investigation of these claims.‖31 The situation was no better in
1940, when Congressman Celler explained that the committee could not
know the details of each of the thousands of claims it considered in every
Congress.32 In both the 74th and 75th Congresses, over 2,300 private claim
bills were introduced, seeking more than one hundred million dollars. 33 In
the 77th Congress, there were 1,829 private claims bills, followed by 1,644
in the 78th Congress.34
Various legislative proposals for a broad tort claims act were debated for
decades.35 In 1929, both houses of Congress passed such a bill, but
President Coolidge pocket vetoed it, apparently because it would have
authorized the Comptroller General (an agent of Congress) to represent the
United
States
in
the
Court
of
Claims.36
In the 76th Congress, the House passed H.R. 7263, a bill similar in many
respects to the FTCA, but in 1940, ―the pressure of other urgent matters
prevented its consideration in the Senate before the close of the session.‖37
On January 14, 1942, President Roosevelt sent a formal message to
Congress urging the enactment of a tort claim act so that Congress and the
Executive Branch could deal with larger matters and noting that in the
previous three Congresses, fewer than twenty percent of the 6,300 private
claim bills became law, and that private claims bills accounted for a third
of the bills he had vetoed.38 In the 77th Congress, the Senate passed S.
2221, a bill similar to the prior Congress‘ H.R. 7263.39
31. H.R. REP. NO. 71-2800, at 2 (1931), quoted in Hearings on H.R. 5373 and
H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 52.
32. Debates on H.R. 7236, 86 CONG. REC. 12018 (1940), quoted in Hearings on
H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 54.
33. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 2 (1945).
34. Id.
35. See generally Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 40–41
(discussing the introduction of various legislative remedies in previous decades); LESTER S.
JAYSON & ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS
§§ 2.09–2.10 (2009).
36. H.R. REP. NO. 71-2800, at 1 (1931), cited in Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463,
supra note 20, at 41 (statement of Assistant Att‘y Gen. Francis M. Shea). ―The Attorney
General objected to the act because it placed the Comptroller General in charge of appeals
to the Court of Claims from his own decisions, and the act received a pocket veto by
President Coolidge.‖ Id.; see also O.R. McGuire, Tort Claims Against the United States, 19
GEO. L.J. 133, 134–35 (1931) (discussing the history of President Coolidge‘s pocket veto).
37. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 2 (1945).
38. H.R. DOC. NO. 77-562, at 1 (1942). The Roosevelt Administration, through the
Department of Justice, was actively involved in drafting proposals for a general tort claims
act. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 6–36 (statement of
Assistant Att‘y Gen. Francis M. Shea); Hearings on H.R. 7236 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of
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The legislative and administration proposals for a general tort claims act
waiving sovereign immunity for government tort claims shared a common
limitation—almost all of them had a cap on damages. For example, the
1929 proposal passed by the 70th Congress had a limitation of $50,000 for
property damages and $7,500 for personal injury or death claims.40 The
1940 House bill had a cap of $7,500 for all claims,41 as did President
Roosevelt‘s 1942 proposal,42 and the House bill of 1942.43 The 1942
Senate-passed version capped damages at $10,000.44 In the 79th Congress,
when passage of a statute was at hand, the House bill capped damages at
$10,000 for ―property loss or damage or personal injury or death.‖45 At the
Senate‘s insistence, the proposed damages cap was deleted from the
statute.46
Finally, the 79th Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act as Title
IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.47 On August 2, 1946,
President Truman signed the Legislative Reorganization Act, making the
FTCA law.48 The President‘s signing statement commended Congress for
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong. 15–31 (1940) (statement of Alexander Holtzoff,
Special Assistant to the Att‘y Gen.); JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 35, § 2.10 (noting
that Roosevelt‘s Department of Justice collaborated with other governmental agencies to
draft a federal tort bill).
39. H. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 2 (1945); see also S. REP. NO. 77-1196, at 6 (1942)
(waiving sovereign immunity in part as did H.R. 7236).
40. Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 41.
41. H.R. REP. NO. 76-2428, at 4 (1940).
42. H.R. DOC. NO. 77-562, at 2 (1942).
43. Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 2.
44. S. REP. NO. 77-1196, at 2, 6.
45. H. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 4 (1945).
46. S. REP. NO. 79-1400, at 30 (1946). The report stated:
The essential difference is that the House bill puts a maximum limitation of
$10,000 on claims for which suit may be brought, whereas this title as reported by
your committee contains no such limitation. The committee is of the opinion that
in view of the banning of private claim bills in the Congress no such limitation
should be imposed . . . .
Id.
47. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The Legislative Reorganization Act also
established the organization of congressional committees, id. tits. I, II; regulated lobbying,
id. tit. III; eliminated the need for congressional approval of each new bridge, id. tit. V; and
altered congressional pay, id. tit. VI.
Pertinent to the FTCA, Title I prohibited private bills in circumstances where the FTCA
might provide a remedy:
No private bill . . . directing (1) the payment of money for property damages, for
personal injuries or death for which suit may be instituted under the [FTCA] . . .
shall be received or considered in either the Senate or the House of
Representatives.
Id. § 131. The Legislative Reorganization Act also generally repealed pre-FTCA laws that
authorized federal agencies to pay compensation for the torts of federal employees. Id. §
424(a).
48. 92 CONG. REC. 10,675 (1946) (statement by President Truman upon signing the
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improving its efficiency, expanding the staff of Congressional committees
and of agencies in the Legislative Branch, and raising Congressional
salaries and expense allowances.49 It did not mention the Federal Tort
Claims Act.50
The FTCA grants United States district courts specific, limited subject
matter jurisdiction.51 This jurisdictional grant was intended to limit the
waiver of sovereign immunity: ―The bill therefore does not . . . lift the
immunity of the United States from tort actions except as jurisdiction is
specifically conferred upon the district courts by this bill.‖52 Thus, claims
that would not lie against a private person under state law are not
cognizable under the Act.53 The FTCA contained a number of explicit
exceptions to its waiver of sovereign immunity,54 including two that
obviously would block some suits by injured service members. The
combatant activity exception bars ―[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant
activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of
war.‖55 The foreign tort exception bars ―[a]ny claim arising in a foreign
country.‖56
B. Financial Remedies of Service Members Prior to the
Federal Tort Claims Act
This Section addresses avenues that members of the military might have
pursued to obtain financial relief for service-connected injuries incurred
prior to the effective date of the FTCA. It briefly reviews the uniform
compensation systems available to service members and veterans. It
examines lawsuits brought by military personnel under limited waivers of
sovereign
immunity
enacted
by
Congress.
It discusses the administrative remedies available under the Military Claims

Legislative Reorganization Act). President Truman‘s statement is available through The
American Presidency Project. Statement by the President Upon Signing the Legislative
Reorganization
Act,
THE
AM.
PRESIDENCY
PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12480 (last visited Oct. 24, 2010).
49. 92 CONG. REC. 10,675.
50. Id.
51. Federal Torts Claim Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 410(a), 60 Stat. 812 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006)); The Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 862, (recodifying Title 28
of United States Code). Alterations in the language of the FTCA did not substantively alter
the law. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 n.9 (1950).
52. H. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 5 (1945).
53. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477–78 (1994) (recognizing the FTCA‘s
jurisdictional requirement of comparable private person liability under state law); infra
notes 460–462 and accompanying text.
54. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2006) (listing exceptions).
55. See id. § 2680(j).
56. See id. § 2680(k).
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Act and the Military Personnel Claims Act. Finally, it reviews private
relief legislation designed to provide extra benefits to particular injured
service members beyond those available under established compensation
systems, and President Truman‘s and President Eisenhower‘s vetoes of
those few private bills passed by Congress.
1.

The Uniform Compensation Systems
Congress has provided pensions for military veterans since the
Revolutionary War.57 The World War Veterans‘ Act of 1924 consolidated
laws that established benefits for World War I veterans and their
dependents.58 In 1933, Congress gave the President, acting through the
Veterans Administration, the authority to administer by regulation the
benefits programs for the veterans of World War I and their dependents.59
From 1941 through 1946, Congress enacted a large number of statutes
building on that system and considered many more.60
At the time the FTCA became law, a wide range of remedies were
available to service members, veterans, and their families. Monthly
pensions were provided for service members with partial or total
disabilities.61 Pensions were provided for the widows, children, and

57. See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 84, 13 Stat. 499 (Civil War); Act of May 13,
1846, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 9, 10 (Mexican War); Act of April 24, 1816, ch. 68, 3 Stat. 296–97
(War of 1812); Act of March 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243, 244 (Revolutionary War); Act of
September 29, 1789, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 95 (Revolutionary War).
58. World War Veterans Act, 68 Pub. L. No. 242, 43 Stat. 607 (1924) (―An Act to
consolidate, codify, revise, and reenact the laws affecting the establishment of the United
States Veterans‘ Bureau and the administration of the War Risk Insurance Act, as amended,
and the Vocational Rehabilitation Act, as amended.‖).
59. Act of March 20, 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-2, 48 Stat. 8. The act also encompassed
veterans of the Spanish American War, the Boxer Rebellion, and the Philippines
Insurrection. Id. § 1.
60. For example, from October 17, 1942 to June 30, 1943, Congress introduced 2,366
general bills whose main purpose was to alter veterans‘ benefits and enacted twenty-two
into law. 1943 ADM‘R OF VETERANS‘ AFFS. ANN. REP. 30–41. In the period from July 1,
1945 to August 2, 1946, it considered 1,677 such bills and enacted fifty-eight into law.
1946 ADM‘R OF VETERANS‘ AFFS. ANN. REP. 49–61; see also Brief for the United States at
19, Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949) (Nos. 388 and 389) [hereinafter U.S.
Brooks Br.]. The United States argued:
The most recent compilation of ―Laws Relating to Veterans,‖ [compiled by
Superintendent, Document Room, House of Representatives, 1948] sets forth the
text of over 490 federal statutes enacted during 1914 to 1948. Current
congressional concern for providing an adequate and specialized system of
compensation for serviceman‘s injury or death is also evidenced by the
introduction during the fiscal year 1947, of approximately 2300 bills pertaining to
veterans‘ benefits, and by the introduction of almost 100 such bills during the first
10 days of the first session of the 81st Congress.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
61. 38 U.S.C. § 701a (1946); Act of July 13, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-144, 57 Stat. 554;
Act of March 20, 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-2, § 1(a), 48 Stat. 8.
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dependent parents of service members who were injured or killed.62
Service members who were incapacitated drew full military pay for their
period of incapacitation.63 Service members injured while in service
received free medical care.64 If a service member died in service, six
months pay was paid to his or her beneficiary.65 Subsidized life insurance
was available to service members under the National Service Life
Insurance Act.66 Unlike typical workers‘ compensation statutes, benefits
provided to service members and veterans compensated any injury,
disability, or death that arose at any time during their period of service, not
just those incurred while the service member was acting within the scope of
employment or on active duty.67 Veterans were given hiring preferences in
the civil service,68 housing benefits,69 and educational benefits.70
Huge numbers of service members, veterans, and their families benefited
from these programs in the 1940s. On June 30, 1947, 1,728,516 World
War II veterans were receiving disability benefits.71 On that date, death
benefits were being paid to dependents of 223,554 World War II veterans
for service-connected deaths, and dependents of another 2,053 for nonservice connected deaths.72 In the fiscal year of 1947, similar payments
were made to World War I veterans‘ dependents for 76,760 serviceconnected deaths and 154,717 non-service connected deaths.73

62. 38 U.S.C. § 701c (1946); § 1(c), 48 Stat. at 8.
63. See 10 U.S.C. § 847(a) (1946) (stating that incapacitation arising from alcohol or
drug abuse, as opposed to injury, will not warrant payment); Act of June 16, 1942, Pub. L.
No. 77-607, 56 Stat. 359, 364 (providing allowances for medically ill service members); Act
of May 17, 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-230, 44 Stat. 557 (stating that service members who are
absent from their duties because of venereal disease are permitted allowances).
64. 38 U.S.C. § 434 (1946); § 6, 48 Stat. 8, 9; World War Veterans‘ Act, Pub. L. No.
68-242, § 10, 43 Stat. 607, 610 (1924).
65. Act of December 17, 1919, Pub. L. No. 66-99, 41 Stat. 367, amended by Act of
December 17, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-198, 57 Stat. 599.
66. National Service Life Insurance Act, ch. 757, 54 Stat. 1008, 1009, 1012 (1940).
67. Act of September 27, 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-439, 58 Stat. 752. The statute deemed
any injury or disease to ―have been incurred in line of duty‖ if the service member was ―on
active duty or on authorized leave‖ when the injury or disease arose. Id. § 2. The only
exceptions were injuries or disease that resulted from the service member‘s ―own willful
misconduct,‖ or arose while the service member was deserting, absent without leave, or
―confined under sentence of court martial or civil court.‖ Id.
68. Act of June 27, 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-359, 58 Stat. 387, 388.
69. Servicemen‘s Readjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 78-346, § 501, 58 Stat. 284, 292
(1944) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 694(a) (1946)).
70. Id. § 400, 58 Stat. 284, 287–91 (1994), (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 739, Part VIII
(1946)).
71. 1947 ADM‘R OF VETERANS‘ AFFS. ANN. REP. 19.
72. Id. at 24, 25.
73. Id. at 26, 27.
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2. Tort litigation by military personnel under pre-FTCA
waivers of sovereign immunity
Prior to the enactment of the FTCA, Congress passed other statutes that
waived the government‘s sovereign immunity for specific categories of
torts.74 These included the Suits in Admiralty Act75 and the Public Vessels
Act,76 which consented to suits involving admiralty and maritime torts of
government vessels, and the Railroad Control Act of 1918,77 which
consented to tort suits against the government for its operation of railroads
and utilities under wartime authority. Despite language in these statutes
that made the United States liable to the same extent as a private entity, the
statutes were consistently interpreted to exclude claims made by members
of the military for whom Congress had provided an administrative
remedy.78
Dobson v. United States,79 the leading authority on the issue, arose from
the collision of the Steamship City of Rome and United States Submarine
S-51, a public vessel.80 Suits were brought under the Public Vessels Act by
the estates of three submarine officers who died as a result of the
collision.81 Following judgment for the United States in the district court,
the Second Circuit confronted the issue whether the Public Vessels Act
74. See supra text accompanying note 27 (statement of Assistant Att‘y Gen. Francis M.
Shea) (explaining pre-FTCA waivers of sovereign immunity for suits in tort).
75. Act of March 9, 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-156, § 2, 41 Stat. 525 (codified at
46 U.S.C. § 30903 (2006)). The statute provided:
That in cases where if such vessel were privately owned or operated, or if such
cargo were privately owned and possessed, a proceeding in admiralty could be
maintained at the time of the commencement of the action herein provided for, a
libel in personam may be brought against the United States . . . provided that such
vessel is employed as a merchant vessel or is a tug boat . . . .
Id. at 525–26.
76. Act of March 3, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-546, 43 Stat. 1112 (current version at
46 U.S.C. § 31102 (2006)). The statute provided, ―[t]hat a libel in personam in admiralty
may be brought against the United States, or a petition impleading the United States, for
damages caused by a public vessel of the United States.‖ Id. at 1112.
77. Act of March 21, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-107, § 10, 40 Stat. 451, 456. The statute
provided:
That carriers while under Federal control shall be subject to all laws and liabilities
as common carriers, whether arising under State or Federal laws or at common law
. . . . Actions at law or suits in equity may be brought by and against such carriers
and judgments rendered as now provided by law; and in any action at law or suit in
equity against the carrier, no defense shall be made thereto upon the ground that the
carrier is an instrumentality or agency of the Federal Government.
Id.
78. See infra notes 79–105 and accompanying text (discussing how courts have
interpreted the statutes to exclude claims of service members).
79. 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928).
80. Haselden v. United States, 24 F.2d 529, 530 (E.D.N.Y. 1927), aff’d sub nom.
Dobson v. United States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928).
81. Id.
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provided a remedy for the officers‘ deaths under these circumstances.82
The court accepted that the language of the Public Vessels Act, read alone,
might be broad enough to allow suit by officers and crew of a public
vessel.83 Nevertheless, it ruled that no recovery could be had on behalf of
the submarine officers from the United States, reasoning that the statute did
not specify who might sue and that allowing such suits would be ―so
radical a departure from the government‘s long-standing policy with
respect to the personnel of its naval forces that we cannot believe the act
should be given such a meaning.‖84 The court recognized that the elaborate
pension system provided to naval personnel was less generous than the
recovery available under the Public Vessels Act. The court found,
however, that the statute‘s general language was insufficiently specific to
justify upsetting long-standing and well-known policy.
The court
explained that ―[t]he more natural meaning of the act is to refer it to
damage caused by the ship to third persons who are not of her company,
and generally, if not universally, the damage will be the result of a
collision.‖85
The Second Circuit again addressed the issue of service member suits
against the federal government in Bradey v. United States,86
a Public Vessels Act suit alleging that a Navy fireman was killed in 1944
when his destroyer was negligently struck by another vessel owned by the
United States.87 The circuit court affirmed the district court‘s dismissal.88
Judge Learned Hand, writing for the court, explained:
It is quite true that nothing in the text of the Public Vessels Act bars suit
by a member of the armed forces, but in Dobson . . . we held that,
because of the compensation elsewhere provided for such persons, they
must be deemed excluded from its protection. That case directly rules
here . . . .89

A similar line of authority holds that the government‘s waiver of
sovereign immunity in the Railroad Control Act did not open the United

82. Dobson, 27 F.2d at 808.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 808–09; see also O‘Neal v. United States, 11 F.2d 869, 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1925)
(―Congress by this enactment [of the Public Vessels Act] clearly did not intend to overturn
the government‘s established policy, and permit its employees to bring actions for damages
received on government ships in the course of their employment . . . .‖), aff’d per curiam, 11
F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1926).
85. Dobson, 27 F.2d at 809. The court also addressed statutes that provided
administrative compensation for lost property of officers and sailors. Id.
86. 151 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1945).
87. Id. at 742.
88. Id. at 743.
89. Id.
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States to suit by service members.90 In Moon v. Hines,91 a Reserve
Officers‘ Training Corps soldier was injured while traveling by rail under
military orders on September 30, 1918, and brought a tort action against the
Director General of Railroads.92 The Supreme Court of Alabama
concluded that the soldier‘s administrative compensation provided under
the War Risk Insurance Act93 was exclusive, barring his suit in tort.94 The
court reasoned that Congress had not authorized such a suit against the
government arising from its transportation of a service member.95 It
explained that the soldier‘s enlistment was a contract that changed his
relationship with the government, giving him a new status with different
rights and duties.96
In Seidel v. Director General of Railroads,97 a World War I sailor
walking down the street to his ship lost an eye when a railroad guard‘s
shotgun accidentally fired.98 The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the
sailor‘s war risk insurance barred his suit in tort: ―If plaintiff had this
remedy by suit in damages he would have against the government two
remedies: One in damages; and one under said act. The government has
not so provided; but has provided only the one remedy under said act.‖99
In Sandoval v. Davis,100 the district court dismissed three consolidated
actions of enlisted men who were allegedly injured or killed while in the
line of duty by negligent operations of railroads under federal control.101
Each family had accepted compensation under the war risk insurance
program.102 The court concluded that a suit in tort was barred ―because of
the compensation provisions of the War Risk Insurance Act.‖103 The
Sandoval opinion spoke to its similarity to the Moon and Seidel decisions:
The conclusion in these three cases is the same. The three different
courts reached this conclusion by somewhat different argument. It
seems to me that the reasoning of all three opinions is sound. Congress

90. See Moon v. Hines, 87 So. 603, 607 (Ala. 1921).
91. 87 So. 603 (Ala. 1921).
92. Id. at 603–04.
93. The 1917 amendments to the War Risk Insurance Act provided benefits for the
death or disability of all enlisted personnel and officers in the United States military. See
Act of October 6, 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-91, § 300, 40 Stat. 398, 405.
94. Moon, 87 So. at 607.
95. Id. at 607–08.
96. Id. at 608.
97. 89 So. 308 (La. 1921).
98. Id. at 308.
99. Id. at 309.
100. 278 F. 968 (N.D. Ohio 1922), aff’d per curiam, 288 F. 56 (6th Cir. 1923).
101. Id. at 969–70, 974–75.
102. Id. at 970.
103. Id. at 972.
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did not intend to confer upon an injured or killed soldier or sailor a right
to a double recovery of compensation from the United States. . . . The
general creation and preservation of rights of action by section 10,
Federal Control Act, and section 206, Transportation Act of 1920, must
yield to the specific provisions covering the injuries of a soldier or sailor
on active service in the line of his duty. The rights and remedies of a
soldier or sailor in that situation are specially provided for and limited by
the provisions of the War Risk Insurance Act.104

The Sixth Circuit affirmed, per curiam.105
3.

The Military Claims Act and the Military Personnel Claims Act
In 1943, Congress enacted the Military Claims Act to consolidate a
number of statutes that previously authorized the War Department to settle
tort claims administratively.106 The procedures, scope, and limitations of
those statutes varied greatly.107 The Military Claims Act was intended to
―make possible the investigation, settlement, and payment in a uniform
manner of all small claims; i.e. those not in excess of $500, or in time of
war not in excess of $1,000, within the War Department.‖108 The act did
not authorize lawsuits, but established an administrative remedy
for damage to or loss or destruction of property, real or personal, or for
personal injury or death, caused by military personnel or civilian
employees of the War Department or of the Army while acting within
the scope of their employment, or otherwise incident to noncombat
activities of the War Department or of the Army . . . .109

104. Id. at 974–75.
105. Sandoval, 288 F. at 56–57 (citing Dahn v. Davis, 258 U.S. 421 (1922)) (holding that
the Federal Employees‘ Compensation Act was an exclusive remedy, barring suit under the
Railroad Control Act).
106. Act of July 3, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-112, 57 Stat. 372 (codified with some difference
in language at 31 U.S.C. § 223b (1946), now codified at 10 U.S.C.
§§ 2731-39 (2006)). The consolidated statutes included: Act of August 24, 1912, Pub. L.
No. 62-338, 37 Stat. 569, 586, that authorized settlements of claims of up to $1,000
―occasioned by heavy gun fire and target practice of troops, and for damages to vessels,
wharves, and other private property, found to be due to maneuvers or other military
operations for which the Government is responsible,‖ id.; Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 335, 23
Stat. 350, as amended by Act of July 9, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-193,
40 Stat. 845, 880, and by Act of March 4, 1921, Pub. L. No. 66-391, 41 Stat. 1436, allowing
settlement of claims by military personnel for loss of personal property, id.; Act of
December 28, 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-375, 42 Stat. 1066, that authorized ―the head of each
department . . . to . . . adjust . . . any claim . . . on account of damages to or loss of privately
owned property where the amount of the claim does not exceed $1,000, caused by the
negligence of any officer or employee of the Government acting within the scope of his
employment.‖ Id. § 2. See generally Martha L. Neese & Thomas J. Lyons, The Military
Claims Act: Remedy or Run Around?, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 305, 307–09 (1990).
107. S. REP. NO. 78-243, at 3 (1943).
108. Id. at 2.
109. Act of July 3, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-112, 57 Stat. 372, 372–73.
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The Secretary of War or his designee could settle such claims outright
or, if they exceeded $1,000, report them to Congress ―for its
consideration.‖110 The statute did not require the claimant to make a
showing of negligence or wrongful act.111 The Military Claims Act remedy
was not available if the damage or injury was ―caused in whole or in part
by any negligence or wrongful act on the part of the claimant, his agent, or
employee,‖ or if a written claim was not presented within one year.112 Nor
did it apply ―to claims for damage to or loss or destruction of property . . .
or for personal injury or death of [military personnel or civilian employees
of the War Department or of the Army] if such . . . injury, or death
occur[red] incident to their service.‖113
The Military Claims Act was deemed inadequate because it compensated
some claims of military personnel but arbitrarily excluded similar claims
that did not fall within the precise language of the statutes that had been
consolidated in the Act.114 The Secretary of War recommended clarifying
legislation specifically directed to the claims of service members and
civilian employees of the War Department.115 Accordingly, Congress
enacted the Military Personnel Claims Act of 1945.116
A key change made by the newer act allowed military members and
civilian employees to recover on claims for loss or damage to property
even if that loss or damage was incurred incident-to-service.117 The
incident-to-service bar however, was retained for claims alleging personal
injury or death.118 The Military Claims Act and the Military Personnel
Claims Act were codified together in the 1946 edition of the United States
Code.119
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. See H.R. REP. NO. 79–237, at 1–2 (1945) (―[T]he present statutes . . . do not grant
equal justice in that the claim of one member of the Army may be approved while a similar
claim by another member who lost property in the same incident
is . . . barred by some technical limitation of the law.‖).
115. Id. at 2–4 (attaching Letter from Robert Patterson, Acting Sec‘y of War (Feb. 2,
1945)).
116. Act of May 29, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-67, 59 Stat. 225 (codified with some
difference in language at 31 U.S.C. § 223b (1946), now codified at 10 U.S.C.
§§ 2731–39 (2006)).
117. See 59 Stat. at 225–26.
118. Id. (―The provisions of this Act shall not be applicable to claims . . . for personal
injury or death of military personnel or civilian employees of the War Department or of the
Army if such injury or death occurs incident to their service.‖ (emphasis added)).
119. 31 U.S.C. § 223b. In 1945 the Secretary of the Navy received comparable
authority. Act of December 28, 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-277, 59 Stat. 662 (codified with some
difference in language at 31 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1946), now codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 2731-39
(2006)). The compensation provided for injury or death not ―incident to service‖ was

PAUL FIGLEY 60.2

410

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:393

4. Private relief bills for injured service members & the Uniform
Compensation System
Like other citizens, members of the military can seek private legislation
to compensate them for injuries caused by the government.120 In the years
before the FTCA was enacted, private bills were not viable avenues to
increased compensation for injured military service members, perhaps
because of the general awareness that systems were in place to provide
appropriate relief121 and out of concern for uniformity.122 In fact, from
1942 through 1947, no private bills granting monetary benefits to World
War II veterans or their dependents became law.123
The 79th Congress did act favorably on a private bill that would have
awarded $500 in money damages to Ensign Joseph Lanser for injuries he
incurred in a Navy bus accident on August 26, 1944, while serving in the
military.124 However, on August 2, 1946, the same day he signed the
FTCA into law, President Truman vetoed the Lanser private bill to preserve
the established uniform system for the compensation of those injured while
in military service.125 The President was typically succinct in explaining
why he decided to veto the serviceman‘s remedy:
Ensign Lanser was on active duty with the Navy at the time of the
accident. He was hospitalized in a naval hospital and is entitled to the
same rights and benefits extended to all other members of the armed
forces who sustained personal injuries while in an active duty status. No
reason is evident why special treatment should be accorded this
officer.126

In 1948, President Truman again cited the importance of treating injured
service members uniformly when he vetoed a $4,244 private bill for the
relief of the estate of Lee Jones Cardy, a Navy chief pharmacist mate who
was killed in a vehicle accident caused by government negligence near San
limited to reasonable medical and burial expenses. 31 U.S.C. § 223b (1946).
120. See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text.
121. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950); Jefferson v. United States, 77
F. Supp. 706, 712 (D. Md. 1948) aff’d, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
122. See infra text accompanying notes 124–33 (comments of Presidents Truman and
Eisenhower).
123. 1947 ADM‘R OF VETERANS‘ AFFS. ANN. REP. 146; 1946 ADM‘R OF VETERANS‘ AFFS.
ANN. REP. 108; 1945 ADM‘R OF VETERANS‘ AFFS. ANN. REP. 69; 1944 ADM‘R OF VETERANS‘
AFFS. ANN. REP. 68; 1943 ADM‘R OF VETERANS‘ AFFS. ANN. REP. 66; 1942 ADM‘R OF
VETERANS‘ AFFS. ANN. REP. 67. Indeed, as of 1947 only two private bills granting financial
relief to World War I veterans had become law. See 1947 ADM‘R OF VETERANS‘ AFFS. ANN.
REP. 146.
124. H.R. DOC. NO. 79–767, at 1–2 (1946)(returning H.R. 4660, a bill for the relief of
Mrs. Georgia Lanser and Ensign Joseph Lanser, without his approval).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1.
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Diego on November 17, 1944.127 The President explained that ―[a]pproval
of this measure . . . would be discriminatory in character in that it would
grant to the estate a special benefit denied to the estates of other members
of the armed forces where the facts are similar.‖128 He noted in detail the
benefits Chief Cardy‘s family would receive under laws administered by
the Veterans‘ Administration and the military services,129 and found that
payment of those benefits distinguished this private bill from those of
civilians who had no administrative remedy.130
President Eisenhower voiced similar concerns when he vetoed private
relief legislation intended to override final Veterans‘ Administration
decisions denying benefits.131 In vetoing a bill that would have deemed a
World War II veteran‘s eye injury to be service-connected, the President
stated:
I consider it unwise to set aside the principles and rules of administration
prescribed in the general laws governing veterans‘ benefit programs.
Uniformity and equality of treatment to all who are similarly situated
must be the steadfast rule if the Federal programs for veterans and their
dependents are to be operated successfully. 132

127. Harry S Truman, S. DOC. NO. 80–179, at 1–3 (1948) (returning, without his
approval, bill S. 252 for the relief of the estate of Lee Jones Cardy).
128. Id. at 2–3.
129. Id. at 2. These included: Navy-paid death gratuity payment equal to six months
pay ($756); Army-paid burial expenses ($227.93); Veterans‘ Administration monthly
payments for death compensation to Mr. Cardy‘s widow ($78/month); Veterans‘
Administration monthly payments for death compensation to Mr. Cardy‘s mother
($54/month); and Government life insurance monthly installments ($36.20) from Mr.
Cardy‘s $10,000 policy. Id. The 1947 median income for a male U.S. Worker was $2,324.
U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1988 to 2003 Annual Social and Economic
Supplements,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/p53ar.html.
130. S. DOC. NO. 80-179, at 3. President Truman likewise vetoed a private bill that
would have paid a lump sum of $10,000 to pilot Ernest Jenkins who was injured in a 1942
Georgia airplane crash while on active duty with the Civil Air Patrol. Harry S Truman, S.
DOC. NO. 81-120, at 1–3 (1949)(returning bill S. 377, an Act for the Relief of Ernest J.
Jenkins, without his approval). The President stated:
[I]t is clear that to single [Jenkins] out for special treatment in this fashion would
discriminate against and deny equal justice to others who may have suffered
equally or worse.
The records of the Civil Air Patrol indicate that over 50 of its members lost
their lives and somewhat less than 100 were injured on its missions in World War
II. Benefits are still being paid under the civilian war-benefits program to the
dependents
of
33
members
who
were
killed
and
to
4 members who were injured.
Id. at 2.
131. H.R. DOC. NO. 83–426, at 1–3 (1954) (returning bill H.R. 3109, 83d Cong. (1954)
an Act for the relief of Theodore W. Carlson, without his approval).
132. Id. at 2.
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He used identical language when he vetoed a bill that decreed a soldier who
committed suicide in 1943 while in a Mississippi guardhouse ―shall be held
and considered to have [died] in line of duty.‖133
II. JUDICIAL ANTECEDENTS TO FERES AFTER ENACTMENT OF THE
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
This part examines the key, pre-Feres judicial decisions that addressed
whether, and to what extent, the FTCA provided a remedy to members of
the military. It begins by examining the two seminal district court opinions
in Jefferson v. United States134 that influenced much of the subsequent
jurisprudence.135 It discusses the Brooks v. United States136 litigation that
culminated in the Supreme Court‘s decision, reached a year before Feres,
which held that the FTCA authorized suits by service members for injuries
that did not arise incident to military service.137 It ends by describing the
Jefferson, Griggs, and Feres circuit court decisions that were jointly heard
by the Supreme Court in Feres.138
A. Judge Chesnut & Jefferson v. United States
In the Jefferson litigation, United States District Judge William Chesnut
of the District of Maryland issued a pair of influential opinions that laid the
groundwork for the Feres debate.139 The Jefferson cases arose from an
army surgeon‘s negligence in leaving a thirty-inch by eighteen-inch towel
in the body cavity of his patient, Army flight chief Arthur Jefferson, an
active duty soldier.140 The United States moved to dismiss, arguing that
Congress had not intended for the FTCA to authorize suits by service
members for the negligence of other service members.141 It reasoned that
the veterans‘ benefits programs provided an exclusive remedy, citing
Public Vessel Act cases which held that military members could not sue the
government in tort although that statute waived sovereign immunity for
133. H.R. DOC. NO. 83-432, at 1–2 (1954) (returning bill H.R. 6242, 83d Cong. (1954)
an Act for the relief of Mrs. Josette L. St. Marie, without his approval).
134. 77 F. Supp. 706 (D. Md. 1948), aff’d, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom.
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Jefferson v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 209 (D.
Md. 1947).
135. Supra note 135.
136. 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
137. Id. at 54.
138. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949),
rev’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d
535 (2d Cir. 1949), aff’d, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
139. See Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. at 708; Jefferson, 74 F. Supp. at 210.
140. Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. at 708.
141. Id. at 711.
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injuries caused by a United States public vessel.142 The government also
argued that the relationship between it and its service members was of a
special nature unlike typical master-servant or employer-employee
relations. Therefore, it concluded, Congress did not intend the FTCA to
apply to claims arising from the mutual duties and obligations running
between military members and the government which are governed by
federal law143 when the FTCA applies the tort law applicable to private
persons under the state law ―of the place where the act or omission
occurred.‖144
In a carefully written opinion of October 23, 1947, Judge Chesnut denied
the United States‘ motion to dismiss without prejudice.145 While
acknowledging the ―plausibility and force‖146 of the argument that
Congress did not intend for the FTCA to authorize all suits by members of
the military because it had created ―an elaborate system of disability and
pension allowances‖147 for them, he noted that the Act specifically included
members of the military in its definitions of ―‗Employee of the
Government‘ [and] ‗[a]cting within the scope of . . . employment,‘‖148
thereby bringing their torts within the Act‘s general waiver of sovereign

142. Jefferson, 74 F. Supp. at 210–11 (citing Bradey v. United States, 151 F.2d 742 (2d
Cir. 1945); Dobson v. United States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928)).
143. Jefferson, 74 F. Supp. at 211 (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301
(1947)). In Standard Oil, the government sought to recover the amount of pay and medical
expenses it had expended for a soldier injured by a negligently driven Standard Oil truck.
332 U.S. at 302. The Court declined to decide the case under state law, reasoning that:
Perhaps no relation between the Government and a citizen is more distinctively
federal in character than that between it and members of its armed forces. To
whatever extent state law may apply to govern the relations between soldiers or
others in the armed forces and persons outside them or nonfederal governmental
agencies, the scope, nature, legal incidents and consequences of the relation
between persons in service and the Government are fundamentally derived from
federal sources and governed by federal authority.
Id. at 305–06. It explained that state law is inappropriate for deciding such issues. Id. at
309–10 (―Not only is the government-soldier relation distinctively and exclusively a
creation of federal law, but we know of no good reason why the Government‘s right to be
indemnified in these circumstances . . . should vary in accordance with the different rulings
of the several states . . . .‖). The Court held that the United States could not recover because
it is for Congress to decide whether the United States can bring suit to recover losses it
sustains for injury to its soldiers, and Congress had not created such a cause of action. Id. at
315–17.
144. Jefferson, 74 F. Supp. at 211 (quoting Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No.
79-601 § 402(b), 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006))). The
government also argued that under general Military Law, a government is not liable to a
soldier of the militia injured by the negligence of fellow soldiers. Id. at 214.
145. Id. at 209–10, 216.
146. Id. at 211.
147. Id. at 210.
148. Id. at 211 (citing Federal Tort Claims Act § 402(b)–(c) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
2671 (2006))).
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immunity.149 He also noted that the Act included twelve enumerated
exceptions to the general waiver, but not one explicitly for claims by
service members although prior legislative proposals had included an
exception for ―claims for which compensation was provided by the . . .
World War Veterans‘ Act of 1924.‖150 He expressed concern that the
Public Vessels Act cases were distinguishable because that act had very
general language about who could bring suit151 compared to the FTCA‘s
explicit jurisdictional grant152 and its clear intent to allow suits against the
government for ―the negligent acts of military personnel.‖153 Recognizing
that the military stands in a special, federal relationship to the
government,154 he acknowledged that there may be merit to the argument
that allowing the Jefferson suit might create a ―heretofore non-existent
tort, . . . not within the intention of Congress‖ under circumstances where a
private person would not be liable under state law as required by the
FTCA‘s jurisdictional grant.155 Nonetheless, he was not persuaded,
concluding that the motion to dismiss should be denied without prejudice,
but suggesting that, ―[p]erhaps the proper application of the Act will
become clearer on further argument and consideration and the possible
narrowing of issues by the developed facts of the particular case.‖156
On May 7, 1948, following a trial on the merits, Judge Chesnut revisited
the government‘s motion to dismiss and issued a second opinion.157 The
judge made findings of fact that during a cholecystostomy operation on
July 3, 1945, while Mr. Jefferson was on active duty,158 his military
surgeon negligently left in his body cavity a towel thirty inches long and
eighteen inches wide, marked ―Medical Department U.S. Army.‖159 The
towel was removed when it was discovered during an operation on March
13, 1946.160 Mr. Jefferson suffered a serious hernia which made it doubtful
that he could return to his occupation as a mechanic.161 After his discharge,

149. Id. at 211.
150. Id. at 211–12 (citing 86 CONG. REC. 12015–32 (1940)).
151. Id. at 212–13.
152. Id. at 213 (citing Federal Tort Claims Act § 410(a) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) (2006))).
153. Id. at 214.
154. Id. at 215 (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 310–11 (1947)).
155. Id. at 215.
156. Id. at 216.
157. Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. 706, 706, 711 (D. Md. 1948), aff’d, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir.
1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
158. Id. at 708. Mr. Jefferson had enlisted in the Army on October 22, 1942, when he
was forty-five years old, and received his honorable discharge on January 9, 1946. Id.
159. Id. at 708–09.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 709.
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Mr. Jefferson applied for service-connected disability payments and, at the
time of trial, was receiving 100% disability from the Veterans‘
Administration of $138 per month, for a prospective lifetime award of
$31,947.162 The court found that had he been able to return to his prior
employment, ―[t]he commuted value of this earning capacity for [his]
estimated life expectancy of 22 years would be about $45,000.‖163 Judge
Chesnut concluded that if Jefferson had a valid claim under the FTCA and
his administrative awards were deducted from his damages, ―a sum of
$7,500 would be an appropriate verdict.‖164
After setting forth his findings of fact, Judge Chesnut revisited the
question raised in the government‘s motion to dismiss. 165 He cogently
stated the issue:
The problem of statutory construction now presented is whether the
comprehensive phrase ―any claim against the United States, for money
only‖ . . . without words of limitation as to classes of persons who may
make the claim, should be narrowed by construction to exclude claims
made by members of the Armed Forces of the United States for serviceconnected injuries sustained while in such service, in view of the special
relationship long existing between the United States and members of its
military forces, and the large body of federal legislation upon the subject.
These include elaborate provisions for pay and allowances and
retirement benefits . . . .166

He recognized that the problem was especially difficult because the
FTCA contained a number of explicit exceptions but none that barred all
service-connected claims by service members, although a prior draft of the
Act had included an exception ―for the same general purpose.‖167
Nonetheless, he concluded that the FTCA did not encompass such
claims.168
In explaining this decision, Judge Chestnut noted the principle of
statutory construction that a statute should not be read literally when, ―from
the whole subject matter of the particular Act and its setting in the whole
governmental scheme, the court can see that the literal import of the phrase
used is contrary to established policy and would not accord with the real
intention of Congress in passing the Act.‖169 He recognized the ―close
162. Id. at 710.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 710–11.
165. Id. at 711.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 712.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 712 (citing United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174 (1935); Ozawa v. United
States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922); United States v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 563 (1918)).
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precedent‖ of the Second Circuit Public Vessels Act170 cases that barred
claims of service members despite statutory language that generally
allowed suit ―‗against the United States . . . for damages caused by a public
vessel of the United States.‘‖171 He cited Burkhardt v. United States172 for
the proposition that the literal language of one phrase of the FTCA is ―not
applicable in view of other provisions of the Act.‖173
The judge explained that ―the main purpose‖ of the FTCA was to waive
sovereign immunity for ―the ordinary run of tort claims arising in the
United States,‖174 but that the FTCA was only one part (Title IV) of the
more comprehensive Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.175 Title I of
that Act prohibited private relief bills for claims that might be brought
under the FTCA.176 He noted that Congress enacted this provision because
it was overburdened by the deluge of such private bills and ―that an
important if not the main motivation of Congress in enacting the Tort Act
was to transfer such claims to the courts.‖177 He further noted that private
bills to benefit service members for service-connected injuries were
uncommon because of the many administrative remedies Congress had
provided to them.178 Accordingly, he found it ―probable‖ that damages
claims of soldiers for service-connected injuries ―were not within the
contemplation of Congress‖ when it enacted the FTCA.179
Judge Chesnut concluded that claims of military members arising from
their military duty did not fall within the FTCA‘s jurisdictional language
that defined the government‘s tort liability by the standard of a private
person under the law of the state where the tort took place, because ―such
injuries did not constitute common law or statutory torts under the laws of
the several States,‖ and no ―State legislation could properly have affected
the relations of the United States to members of its armed forces which, of
170. Id. (citing Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 781–90 (1946) (now codified at 46
U.S.C. §§ 31101–13 (2006))).
171. Id. (citing Bradey v. United States, 151 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1945); Dobson v. United
States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928); O‘Neal v. United States, 11 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1926)).
172. 165 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1947).
173. Id. at 712 (citing Burkhardt, 165 F.2d 869). Burkhardt held that despite language of
the FTCA limiting liability to ―circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable [to the claimant] in accordance with the law of the place,‖ state statutes of
limitations defenses are inapplicable because the FTCA included statutes of limitations. 165
F.2d at 871, 874 (citing FTCA § 410(a)).
174. Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. at 712; see also id. at 713 (citing S. REP. NO. 79-1400
(1946)); H.R. REP. NO. 79-2614 (1946).
175. Id. at 712.
176. Id. (citing Legislative Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 131, 60 Stat. 812,
831 (1946)).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 712–13.
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course, depended purely on federal law.‖180 He found support for this
conclusion in United States v. Standard Oil Co.,181 which held that the
government had no right to subrogation for injuries to its military members
because Congress had not created one ―in federal law, and . . . it would be
incongruous to give such a right of action in view of the variable State laws
which might apply to any particular soldier dependent upon where he
happened to be at the time.‖182 He quoted Standard Oil‘s summary of the
―distinctively federal‖ nature of the United States‘ relationship to its
military members.183 He concluded that the FTCA‘s private person under
state law standard for assigning tort liability is ―inapt‖ for the military
plaintiff.184
B. Brooks v. United States
The Feres decision was foreshadowed by the Brooks v. United States185
case, which the Supreme Court decided on May 16, 1949.186 In Brooks,
two brothers on furlough from the Army187 were driving with their father in
a private car on a public highway when a civilian federal employee driving
an Army truck negligently struck them.188 Following a trial on the merits,
District Judge Cavanah entered a judgment of $4,000 for the personal
injuries of Welker Brooks,189 and one of $25,000 for the wrongful death of
Arthur Brooks.190 On January 7, 1948, Judge Cavanah denied the
government‘s motion to dismiss; rejecting its argument that suit was barred
because the Brooks brothers had received veterans‘ benefits.191 He gave
two reasons: First, unlike the North Carolina workers‘ compensation
statute, no federal statute declared veterans‘ benefits to be an exclusive
180. Id. at 713.
181. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
182. Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. at 713 (―[W]e know of no good reason why the
Government‘s right to be indemnified in these circumstances, or the lack of such a right,
should vary in accordance with the different rulings of the several states, simply because the
soldier marches or today perhaps as often flies across state lines.‖ (quoting Standard Oil
Co., 332 U.S. at 310)).
183. Id. (quoting Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 305).
184. Id. at 714 (―It is hardly conceivable to analogize the liability of the United States to
that of a private individual in respect to service-connected disabilities in view of the
government-soldier particular relationship.‖).
185. 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
186. Id. at 49.
187. United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 841 (4th Cir. 1948), rev’d, 337 U.S. 49
(1949). The Fourth Circuit issued its opinion on August 26, 1948. Id. at 840.
188. 337 U.S. at 50.
189. Id.; United States v. Brooks, 176 F.2d 482, 483 (4th Cir. 1949).
190. Brooks, 176 F.2d at 484. The father, James Brooks, received a judgment of $5,000
for his personal injuries. Brooks, 337 U.S. at 51 n.1; Transcript of Record at 27, Brooks,
337 U.S. 49 (Nos. 388 and 389).
191. Transcript of Record at 19, supra note 191.
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remedy.192 Second, because the FTCA made the government liable in the
same manner as a private person and the then-recent Ninth Circuit
Standard Oil decision allowed a service member to recover both
administratively from the veterans‘ benefit program and in tort from a
tortfeasor without subrogation by the government, ―it would follow that the
government may make veterans‘ payments to the plaintiff and at the same
time be liable to him as a tortfeasor.‖193
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed in a split decision.194 Writing for
the majority, Judge Dobie adopted much of Judge Chesnut‘s analysis in
Jefferson, but went beyond it to conclude that all claims of military
members were excluded from the FTCA, not just those that arose from
their military service.195 The court noted the comprehensive nature of the
compensation system for service members and veterans,196 the unique
relationship between service members and the federal government,197 and
the incongruity of barring suit by service members injured in combat or
foreign lands but allowing claims arising from non-combat domestic
activities:
Thus, under the [combatant activity] exception, a soldier killed or injured
in the important and perilous combat activities of war would be denied a
recovery; while there would be a perfect claim for the soldier killed or
injured in non-combat activities. Under the [foreign tort] exception, for a
soldier injured or killed while stationed in Canada, no recovery; for a
soldier injured or killed at Plattsburg, New York, just a few miles from
the Canadian border, again a recovery. It is difficult for us to think that
Congress intended such results to flow from the Federal Tort Claims
Act.198

Judge Dobie relied on the Dobson and Bradey Public Vessels Act
decisions199 and the Sandoval Railroad Control Act opinion, all of which
192. Id. at 26.
193. Id. (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 153 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1946), aff’d,
332 U.S. 301 (1947)).
194. United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1948), rev’d, 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
195. Id. at 842–45 (citing Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. 706, 711–14 (D. Md. 1948), aff’d, 178
F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)) (―We
are quite unable to find in the Act anything which would justify us in holding that Congress
intended to include death of, or injury to, a soldier, which was not service-caused (the
instant case) and to exclude service-caused injury or death (the Jefferson case).‖)).
196. Id. at 842–43.
197. Id. at 842.
198. Id. at 844.
199. Id. at 843–44 (quoting Bradey v. United States, 151 F.2d 742, 743 (2d. Cir. 1945);
Dobson v. United States, 27 F.2d 807, 808, 809 (2d. Cir. 1928)) (―If it had been the purpose
to change that policy as respects officers and seamen of the navy injured . . . by the fault of
one another, because that is what in the end it comes to, we cannot think it would have been
left to such general language . . . .‖).
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held that general waivers of sovereign immunity do not allow suits by
service members when Congress has provided them with an administrative
remedy.200
In dissent, Chief Judge Parker argued it was unreasonable to think that
Congress would overlook the potential tort ―claims of soldiers . . . at a time
when soldiers and their rights were so prominently in the public mind.‖201
He reasoned that the FTCA included twelve exceptions, but not one for
claims of military members,202 although a prior version of the Act had
included an exception barring ―[a]ny claim for which compensation is
provided by the Federal Employees‘ Compensation Act, as amended, or by
the World War Veterans‘ Act of 1924, as amended.‖203 He rejected the
argument that allowing suits for claims ―not arising out of service‖ would
disrupt military discipline.204 He pointedly noted that the Brooks‘ claims
did not involve injuries arising from their military service as had those in
Jefferson, and ―[e]ntirely different considerations might operate to deny
recovery in such case, as [was] suggested in the opinion of Judge
Chesnut.‖205
Facing this body of law, counsel for the Brooks crafted petitions for
certiorari to avoid the key adverse authority by emphasizing that the
brothers‘ activities at the time of the accident were entirely divorced from
their military service. They framed the ―Questions Involved‖ as:
Did Congress intend that members of the armed services should have
no rights of action under the Federal Tort Claims Act?
More particularly, if a member of the armed services is injured under
circumstances wholly unconnected with military affairs and not in any
way growing out of any armed service status or relationship, and if the
situation is one which may readily occur and does occur with respect to
persons not in the armed service and is a situation in which other
persons, in general, do clearly have rights of action under the Federal
Tort Claims Act—did Congress nevertheless intend that in such situation
the claimant, merely because of the circumstance that he belongs to the
armed service, shall have no right of action?206

200. Id. at 844 (citing Sandoval v. Davis, 288 F. 56 (6th Cir. 1923)).
201. Id. at 847 (Parker, C.J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 848.
203. Id. at 849 (noting that the missing exception ―was omitted, with apparent
deliberation‖ (citing Federal Tort Claims Act, H.R. 181, 79th Cong. (1945)); S. REP. NO. 791400, at 30 (1946)).
204. Id. at 850.
205. Id.
206. Petition for Writs of Certiorari at 3, Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949)
(Nos. 388 and 389).
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They argued that, ―Welker B. Brooks and Arthur L. Brooks were
soldiers. But their being soldiers had nothing whatever to do with their
respective injury and death‖ or the brothers‘ presence ―on the highway.‖207
They distinguished Dobson, Bradey, and Sandoval because, unlike the
Brooks‘ situation, ―the injuries involved in [those] . . . cases were ‗servicecaused,‘ that is, occurred because the injured men were members of the
armed forces and incurred their injuries during the course of activities
necessitated by or incident to their military service.‖208 They distinguished
Jefferson on the same grounds, arguing Jefferson ―was on the operating
table . . . only because of his being a soldier. The army surgeon was
operating on him only because of the military and army relationship
between the two of them.‖209 The Supreme Court granted the Brooks‘
petitions for certiorari on January 3, 1949.210
The United States began its argument with the cases that excluded claims
of service members from general waivers of the government‘s tort
sovereign immunity.211 In response to the plaintiffs‘ argument that the
brothers‘ injuries were not connected to their military service, the
government maintained that the cases barring tort suits of service members
turned on the existence of the comprehensive compensation system rather
than the manner in which the injury was incurred.212 The government went
on to argue that Congress had provided an ―adequate and comprehensive
statutory system for handling death or injury claims of members of the
armed forces,‖213 and that Congress did not intend for the FTCA to provide
duplicate compensation.214 It explained that while a primary purpose of the
Legislative Reform Act of 1946 and the FTCA was to increase legislative
efficiency by removing Congress‘ responsibility for deciding private bills
involving torts by assigning that job to the courts,215 the number of private
207. Brief in Support of Petition for Writs of Certiorari at 16, Brooks, 337 U.S. 49 (Nos.
388 and 389).
208. Id. at 21.
209. Id. at 22.
210. Brooks v. United States, 335 U.S. 901 (1949). The Brooks‘ petitions were filed on
October 30, 1948, in both the personal injury case and the wrongful death case. Petition for
Writs of Certiorari, Brooks, 337 U.S. 49 (Nos. 388 and 389). Accordingly, two orders were
entered
when
the
petitions
were
granted.
Brooks,
335 U.S. 901.
211. U.S. Brooks Br., supra note 60 at 6, 10–18. Thus, the government cited Dobson, id.
at 12–13; Bradey, id. at 13–14; cases construing the Railroad Control Act of 1918, id. at 14–
16; and the New York Tort Claims Act, id. at 16.
212. See id. at 49 (―The rationale of those cases was not, as contended by petitioner, the
fact that the injuries were service-caused, but rather that there was in existence a
comprehensive statutory system for making payment on such claims.‖).
213. See id. at 6–7; see also id. at 17–30.
214. See id. at 8–10, 30–49.
215. See id. at 30–33.
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bills seeking money for injured or killed service members was
insignificant.216 It reasoned that because the FTCA was enacted to allow
the courts to decide claims that would previously have been submitted to
Congress as private bills by those who had no administrative remedy, ―it is
reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend the Act [to] encompass
an entirely new and distinct group of claims arising out of the death or
injury to soldiers for which it had already adequately provided.‖217 The
government also argued that the plaintiffs‘ acceptance of statutory benefits
barred any recovery under the FTCA.218
The Supreme Court framed the question before it as ―whether members
of the United States armed forces can recover under [the FTCA] for
injuries not incident to their service.‖219 To answer that question, the Court
examined as best it could what Congress had intended when it enacted the
FTCA.220 The Court concluded that the FTCA did waive sovereign
immunity for such claims.221 Justices Frankfurter and Douglass dissented
―substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Dobie.‖222
In reaching its decision, the Court recognized that neither the veterans‘
laws nor the FTCA explicitly stated that the remedies they provided were
exclusive of other remedies, and that Congress had not required an election
of remedies.223 It noted the FTCA‘s exceptions for combatant activities
and foreign torts, and the absence of an exception for claims that might be
compensated under the World War Veterans‘ Act of 1924 that had been
included in prior legislative drafts.224 Together, these suggested to the
Court that Congress did have service members in mind when it enacted the
FTCA.225
On the other hand, the Court acknowledged the potential legitimacy of
the government‘s argument that Congress did not intend to waive immunity
for
claims
by
service
members
for
―[a] battle commander‘s poor judgment, an army surgeon‘s slip of hand,
216. See id. at 33–35.
217. Id. at 36.
218. See id. at 50–52.
219. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 50 (1949).
220. See id. at 51 (arguing that the overseas and combatant activities exceptions made it
plain that Congress had service members in mind when the statute was passed in 1946); id.
at 52 (stating that consequences may provide insight for determining congressional
purpose); id. at 53 (seeing no indication that Congress meant the United States to pay twice
for the same injury).
221. See id. at 54.
222. Id. (Frankfurter & Douglas, JJ., dissenting) (citing United States v. Brooks, 169
F.2d 840 (2d. Cir. 1948), rev’d, 337 U.S. 49 (1949)).
223. See id. at 53.
224. See id. at 51–52.
225. See id. at 52.
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[or] a defective jeep which causes injury.‖226 While recognizing the
substantial authority that might support the government‘s argument in suits
involving military situations,227 the Court concluded that the Brooks facts
did not raise the issue because the brothers‘ injuries were not related to
their military service:
But we are dealing with an accident which had nothing to do with the
Brooks‘ army careers, injuries not caused by their service except in the
sense that all human events depend upon what has already transpired.
Were the accident incident to the Brooks‘ service, a wholly different case
would be presented. We express no opinion as to it, but we may note that
only in its context do [Dobson, Bradey, and Jefferson] have any
relevance. See the similar distinction in 31 U.S.C. § 223b [the Military
Claims Act and the Military Personnel Claims Act]. . . .
The
Government‘s fears may have [a] point in reflecting congressional
purpose to leave injuries incident-to-service where they were, despite
literal language and other considerations to the contrary. The result may
be so outlandish that even the factors we have mentioned would not
permit recovery. But that is not the case before us.228

Accordingly, the Court left for another day the question whether the FTCA
allows suit by service members for claims arising incident to military
service.229 Three cases squarely raising that question were in the judicial
pipeline.
C. The Feres, Griggs, & Jefferson Circuit Court Decisions
In 1949, three circuit courts rendered decisions squarely dealing with the
issue of whether the FTCA waived sovereign immunity for claims arising
from injuries incurred incident to military service.230 These cases were
decided together in the Court‘s Feres opinion.231

226. Id.
227. Id. (citing Bradey v. United States, 151 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1945); Dobson v. United
States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928); Jefferson v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 706 (D. Md.
1948), aff’d, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.
135 (1950)).
228. Id. at 52–53 (citation omitted).
229. Id. at 53. The Court remanded the case for determination whether the judgment
should be reduced for previously paid administrative remedies, and whether that issue had
been preserved for appeal. Id. at 54.
230. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949),
rev’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d
535 (2d Cir. 1949), aff’d, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
231. Feres, 340 U.S. at 136–37.
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1.

Feres v. United States
The Feres litigation alleged that a barracks fire and the death of U.S.
Army Lieutenant Rudolph Feres were caused by government negligence in
maintaining a defective heating plant and failing to guard against fire.232
Lieutenant Feres was quartered under orders in the barracks in Pine Camp,
New York, a federal military post.233 The district court dismissed the case,
relying on the Fourth Circuit‘s Brooks decision.234 On November 4, 1949,
in an opinion by Judge Augustus Hand, the Second Circuit unanimously
affirmed.235
The Second Circuit concluded that its Dobson and Bradey precedents, as
followed by Judge Chesnut in Jefferson, correctly stated the established
rule that service members cannot sue the government in tort for incident-toservice injuries.236 Accordingly, ―[i]f more than the pension system had
been contemplated to recompense soldiers engaged in military service we
think that Congress would not have left such relief to be implied from the
general terms of the Tort Claims Act, but would have specifically provided
for it.‖237 The court saw the Supreme Court‘s Brooks decision to have
recognized an ―exception to this interpretation [for] . . . situations where
military personnel were not on active duty.‖238
The court directly addressed the FTCA‘s twelve exceptions, noting that,
―they relate to the cause of injury rather than to the character of a claimant
who may seek to recover damages for his injuries.‖239 The court
recognized that even though the exceptions ―relieve the government in
certain situations from liability to all persons including civilians, they do
not mention soldiers specifically‖ and ―[t]here would seem to have been no
reason for mentioning soldiers when the latter had not been treated as
having claims for injuries incident to their service.‖240 The court gave short
shrift to the argument that Congress intended to allow FTCA suits for
incident-to-service injuries because it had omitted from the FTCA a
proposed thirteenth exception for, ―‗[a]ny claim for which compensation is

232. 177 F.2d at 536.
233. Id.
234. See id. (citing United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1948), rev’d,
337 U.S. 49 (1949)).
235. Id. at 535.
236. Id. at 537 (citing Bradey v. United States, 151 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1945); Dobson v.
United States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928); Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. 706 (D. Md. 1948), aff’d,
178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v. United States,
340 U.S. 135 (1950)).
237. Id. at 537.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. (citing 31 U.S.C.A. § 223b (1946)).

PAUL FIGLEY 60.2

424

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:393

provided by [Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA)],
as amended, or by the World War Veterans Act of 1924, as amended.‘‖241
Judge Augustus Hand reasoned that FECA, as amended, provided that an
employee receiving benefits under that act, ―‗shall not receive from the
United States any salary, pay, or remuneration whatsoever except in return
for services actually performed, and except pensions for [military]
service.‘‖242 Likewise, ―the World War Veterans‘ Act of 1924, as
amended, provided that ‗no other pension laws or laws providing for
gratuities or payments in the event of death in the service‘ . . . shall be
applicable to disabilities or deaths made compensable under the Act.‖243
Accordingly, the proposed thirteenth exception was likely judged
―unnecessary.‖244 Consequently, the court affirmed dismissal of the suit.245
2.

Griggs v. United States
Griggs v. United States246 alleged that Lt. Colonel Dudley Griggs
underwent surgery at an Army hospital at Scott Air Base, Illinois, and died
as a result of medical malpractice by members of the Army Medical
Corps.247 Lt. Colonel Griggs was on active duty and was admitted to the
hospital under orders.248 The district court granted the government‘s
motion to dismiss on grounds that the complaint failed to state a claim for
relief under the FTCA.249 On November 16, 1949, a divided Tenth Circuit
panel reversed that holding.250
Judge Murrah, writing for the majority, acknowledged that in Jefferson,
Judge Chesnut had concluded that the broad benefits Congress provided to
veterans indicate that ―the obvious purpose of Congress was to exclude‖
from FTCA coverage those claims that arise from the ―unique
Government-soldier relationship.‖251 However, he then noted that the
Supreme Court in Brooks ―was not moved by such considerations.‖252 The
opinion reasoned that a claim for injury to a service member was valid
under the FTCA ―unless it [fell] within one of the twelve exceptions

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
(1950).
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. (citing H.R. 181, 79th Cong. (1945)).
Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C.A. § 757 (1946)).
Id. at 537–38 (quoting 38 U.S.C.A. § 422 (1946)).
Id. at 538.
Id.
178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949) rev’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 2.
Id.
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specifically provided therein; or, unless from the context of the Act it [was]
manifestly plain that despite the literal import of the legislative words,
Congress intended to exclude from coverage civil actions on claims arising
out of a Government-soldier relationship.‖253 Judge Murrah found nothing
in the legislative history ―justifying judicial limitation upon the claims of
servicemen.‖254 He observed that although Congress had included express
exceptions for military claims in eighteen proposed tort claims bills, ―it
conspicuously omitted‖ from the FTCA an exception for ―claims growing
out of a government-soldier relationship.‖255 He concluded that Congress
had deliberately decided not to exclude such claims from the Act. 256 The
opinion did not mention or address Bradey and Dobson.257 In dissent,
Judge Huxman ―adopt[ed] the reasoning of [Judge Chesnut in] the
Jefferson case.‖258
3.

Jefferson v. United States
On December 19, 1949, a unanimous panel of the Fourth Circuit
affirmed Judge Chesnut‘s decision that because Arthur Jefferson‘s injuries
arose from his military service, the FTCA did not provide a tort remedy for
the medical malpractice that left a towel in his body cavity.259 The panel
consisted of Judge Soper who authored the panel‘s opinion,260 Judge Dobie
who had written the Fourth Circuit majority opinion in Brooks,261 and Chief
Judge Parker who had dissented in Brooks.262
The opinion noted that while the Jefferson litigation was proceeding
before Judge Chesnut, the Supreme Court had decided in Brooks that
service members could sue under the FTCA ―for injuries not incident to
their service, but left open the question whether the statute also cover[ed]
claims by service men for injuries incident to their service.‖263 It remarked
that the Second and Tenth Circuits had come to opposite conclusions on
that question in Feres and Griggs.264 The court characterized the choice as
―between a literal interpretation of the Act and a construction which
253. Id. at 2, 3.
254. Id. at 3.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See id. at 1–3.
258. See id. at 3 (Huxman, J., dissenting).
259. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518, 519–20 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom.
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
260. Id. at 518.
261. Id.; United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 841 (4th Cir. 1948), rev’d, 337 U.S. 49
(1949).
262. Jefferson, 178 F.2d at 518; Brooks, 169 F.2d at 846.
263. Jefferson, 178 F.2d at 519.
264. Id.
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recognize[d] the peculiar relationship that exist[ed] between a member of
the armed services and superior military authority.‖265 It recognized that
Congress enacted the FTCA to provide a remedy for ―persons injured
through the negligence of [government] employees‖ in the courts rather
than through the inefficient private bill process ―which burdened the
legislative branch . . . and caused delay.‖266 But the court saw limits on the
scope of that remedy:
It seems unreasonable, however, to conclude that Congress, while
accomplishing these desirable purposes, intended at the same time to
subject every injury sustained by a member of the armed forces in the
execution of military orders to the examination of a court of justice . . . .
If this were so, the civil courts would be required to pass upon the
propriety of military decisions and actions and essential military
discipline would be impaired by subjecting the command to the public
criticism and rebuke of any member of the armed forces who chose to
bring a suit against the United States.267

In concluding that the FTCA did not provide a remedy for
in-service injuries, the court attached no importance to the fact that
proposed exceptions for claims of military personnel were dropped before
final passage of the Act.268 It supported its conclusion by noting the
―distinctively federal character of the government-soldier relationship,‖269
and the unreasonableness of supposing ―in the absence of an express
declaration on the point, that Congress intended to adopt so radical a
departure from its historic policy as to subject internal relationships within
the military establishment to the law of negligence as laid down by the
courts
of
the
several
states.‖270
It recognized that Mr. Jefferson and other service members had a wide
range of allowances and retirement benefits, providing them with generous
remedies outside the tort arena.271 Finally, it cited the Second Circuit‘s
Dobson and Bradey decisions, which held in analogous circumstances that
the Public Vessels Act waiver of sovereign immunity allowing persons to
sue ―the United States in personam for damages caused by the negligent
265. Id. at 519–20.
266. Id. at 520.
267. Id.
268. Id. (citing Orders of Ry. Conductors v. Swan, 329 U.S. 520, 529 (1946); Jewell
Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167 United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161, 168 (1945) (stating
that a court should not give too much weight to the language contained in discarded
measures or to the statements of legislatures in the course of debate when interpreting a
statute)).
269. Id. (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co. 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947)).
270. Id.
271. See id. (citing Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. 706, 711 (D. Md. 1948), aff’d, 178 F.2d 518
(4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)).
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handling of a public vessel refers to damages suffered by third persons but
not by members of the ship‘s company.‖272 It affirmed Judge Chesnut‘s
dismissal of the action.273
III. THE SUPREME COURT & THE FERES DOCTRINE
This Part reviews the parties‘ arguments to the Supreme Court,
summarizes the Court‘s Feres opinion, and briefly reviews the Court‘s
other opinions related to the Feres doctrine.
A. The Parties’ Arguments
The United States’ Arguments
The United States presented its principal arguments to the Supreme
Court in its Griggs petitioner‘s brief.274 The government began by arguing
that Brooks had impliedly recognized that injuries suffered incident-toservice fell outside the Brooks holding that service members could sue
under the FTCA.275 It reasoned that drawing a distinction between injuries
incurred on furlough and those incurred while receiving medical care under
orders was mandated by the need to avoid subjecting claims arising from
military orders to varying state law rules or judicial review which would
undermine military discipline.276 It noted that this distinction explained
why Judge Parker concluded that the Brooks brothers could sue under the
FTCA, but Arthur Jefferson could not.277 The government cited as direct
precedent involving ―the identical problem presented . . . here,‖278 the
Dobson and Bradey Public Vessel Act decisions and the Railroad Control
Act cases that barred suit for incident-to-service injuries under those
waivers of sovereign immunity.279 It noted that in Brooks, the Court had
recognized that Dobson and Bradey ―would have relevance if the accident
had occurred incident to the soldier‘s military service.‖280
1.

272. Id. (citing Bradey v. United States, 151 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1945); Dobson v. United
States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928)).
273. Id.
274. See Brief for the United States, United States v. Griggs, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (No.
31) [hereinafter U.S. Griggs Br.]; Brief for the United States at 3, Feres v. United States,
340 U.S. 135 (1950) (No. 9) [hereinafter U.S. Feres Br.]; Brief for the United States at 4,
Jefferson v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (No. 29) [hereinafter
U.S. Jefferson Br.].
275. See U.S. Griggs Br., supra note 275, at 9–13.
276. See id. at 13.
277. See id. at 12–13.
278. Id. at 18.
279. See id. at 14–19.
280. See id. at 14 (citing United States v. Brooks, 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949)).
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The United States then argued that Congress had not intended for the
FTCA to apply to incident-to-service claims of military members.281
Starting from the Court‘s Brooks admonition that the consequences of an
interpretation allowing such suits ―may provide insight for determination of
congressional purpose,‖282 it reasoned that the unique, completely federal
relationship between government and soldier recognized by the Court in
Standard Oil Co.283 was incompatible with the FTCA‘s requirement that
tort liability of the government be assessed under state law.284 It noted the
impropriety of subjecting that relationship to ―dissimilar and frequently
irreconcilable state statutes and decisions.‖285 It argued that because the
FTCA waived sovereign immunity only under circumstances where a
private person would be liable under state law, and because state law did
not allow one service member to sue another for negligence, the United
States could not be liable on a respondeat superior basis for that
negligence.286 It reasoned that if military members could bring suit for
service-connected injuries, ―it is obvious that the military decisions, orders,
and conduct which constituted the basis for the [claim] . . . would be
thrown open to judicial examination,‖287 undermining military discipline.288
It argued that the Legislative Reorganization Act‘s repeal289 of portions of
the Military Claims Act290 did not authorize suit for incident-to-service
injuries because only provisions allowing recovery were repealed and the
―Military Claims Act . . . does not include claims by servicemen for injury
or death sustained by them incident to their military service.‖291 The
government concluded by noting that the military and veterans‘ benefits
laws provided ready compensation for injured service members and their
families.292
281. See id. at 19–28.
282. Id. at 20 (quoting Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52).
283. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305–06 (1947) (holding that the
United States could not seek indemnity under state law for payments it made on behalf of an
injured soldier because the relationship between the Government and service members was
governed entirely by federal law).
284. U.S. Griggs Br., supra note 274, at 21–26.
285. Id. at 21.
286. See id. at 33–37.
287. Id. at 27; see id. at 26–28 (citing United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 845 (4th
Cir. 1948), rev’d, 337 U.S. 49 (1949)).
288. See id. at 35–36; see also id. at 24–28.
289. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 repealed those statutes that allowed
agencies to make compensatory payments to persons injured by government negligence.
Pub. L. No. 79–601, § 424a, 60 Stat. 812, 846 (1946).
290. See U.S. Griggs Br., supra note 274, at 29. When the brief mentions the Military
Claims Act, it cites 31 U.S.C. § 223b and apparently refers to both the Military Claims Act
and the Military Personnel Claims Act. Id. at 29–30.
291. See id. at 30.
292. See id. at 37–39 (noting that Mrs. Griggs could expect to receive over $22,000 in
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The Plaintiffs’ Arguments
The Griggs, Jefferson, and Feres plaintiffs all argued that the Brooks
holding authorized their suits because there was no basis for distinguishing
soldiers on furlough from those asleep in barracks or receiving care in
hospitals.293 The plaintiffs argued that the FTCA‘s language was plain on
its face and allowed their suits.294 They argued that under canons of
construction, the FTCA should be interpreted to allow incident-to-service
claims, pointing to the FTCA‘s exceptions for discretionary functions,295
combatant activities,296 and foreign torts,297 and the deletion from the
FTCA of a comparable exception for service members‘ claims that had
been in prior drafts: ―[T]he deliberate rejection of this proposed exception
demonstrate[s] that Congress did not intend to exclude members of the
armed forces suffering injuries or death in the United States, and not in
combat, regardless of any other rights . . . conferred under the World War
Veterans‘ Act of 1924 as amended.‖298 Their overarching argument was
that ―[n]either the act as written, its legislative history or avowed purpose
permitted the [c]ourt below to read into the act an exception that was not
there.‖299
Responding to the government‘s arguments, the plaintiffs urged that
Dobson, Bradey, and similar cases arose under statutes that were narrower
2.

compensation from her various federal benefits, but that the Illinois wrongful death statute
limited damages to $15,000); see also U.S. Jefferson Br., supra note 274, at 3–4 (noting that
Jefferson could expect to receive approximately $35,500 in benefits, roughly $7,500 less
than the judgment value of his case). The United States also incorporated by reference,
arguments raised in its Brooks brief. See U.S. Griggs Br., supra note 274, at 30 n.9.
293. Brief for Respondent at 6–7, 10–11, United States v. Griggs, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)
(No. 31) [hereinafter Resp‘t Griggs Br.]; Brief For Petitioner at 14–17, Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (No. 9) [hereinafter Pet‘r Feres Br.]; Brief for Petitioner at 4–7,
Jefferson v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (No. 29) [hereinafter Pet‘r Jefferson Br.]
(―Whether injured on furlough or in an army hospital, each is on active duty and subject to
military control though not engaged in the performance of their normal duties, each is
entitled to the same special statutory benefits . . . .‖) (emphasis in original).
294. See Pet‘r Feres Br., supra note 293, at 5–7; Resp‘t Griggs Br., supra note 293, at 7–
8; Pet‘r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 10; see also id., at 7 (stating that the Act was just as
clear as it was in the Brooks case).
295. See Pet‘r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 13.
296. Pet‘r Feres Br., supra note 293, at 6; Resp‘t Griggs Br., supra note 293, at 16; Pet‘r
Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 15.
297. Pet‘r Feres Br., supra note 293, at 6; Resp‘t Griggs Br., supra note 293, at 16.
298. Resp‘t Griggs Br., supra note 293, at 8–11 (citing United States v. Brooks,
337 U.S. 49, 51 (1949)) (noting that sixteen of the eighteen bills introduced between 1925
and 1935 for tort claims acts had proposed the exclusion of claims for service members);
Pet‘r Feres Br., supra note 293, at 7–8.
299. Pet‘r Feres Br., supra note 293, at 5. Feres also argued that because the FTCA was
complementary to the provision of the Legislative Reorganization Act banning private bills
on tort claims, ―it seem[ed] evident . . . that Congress wanted to rid itself of the great
number of private bills for relief of military personnel and their families presented at every
session.‖ Id. at 12.
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in scope and purpose than the FTCA,300 and that when Congress deleted the
proposed World War Veterans Act exception, it ―repudiated and made
inapplicable to the [FTCA] the doctrine of the Dodson [sic] . . . [and]
Bradey case[s].‖301 They raised the same point in response to the defense‘s
argument that applying state law to tort claims by service members was
incompatible with the federal nature of that relationship and not something
Congress had contemplated.302 They further argued that Congress had
appropriately chosen to ―make the laws of the different states the test of
liability‖ for service members, as it had for other federal matters such as
tax law and bankruptcy law,303 and that the FTCA‘s exceptions and various
state law defenses adequately protected the government‘s interests.304
Griggs argued that Congress‘ failure to include exclusionary ―service
caused claims‖ language in the FTCA as it had in the Military Claims Act,
―indicate[d] that Congress did not choose to exclude such claims from [the
FTCA].‖305 Jefferson and Feres argued that the Military Claims Act and
the Military Personnel Claims Act had no bearing here because they
provided compensation without regard to fault and the FTCA required a
negligent or wrongful act.306
The plaintiffs argued that the military and veterans compensation statutes
did not say they were exclusive,307 their benefits were ―not . . . all-inclusive
[or] complete,‖308 and the Court‘s Brooks decision had held that those
benefits did not cut off service members‘ rights under the FTCA.309 The
plaintiffs disputed that allowing FTCA suits would disrupt military
discipline, reasoning that ―military personnel likely would be better
disciplined . . . [with] knowledge that the Government had accorded them

300. Pet‘r Feres Br., supra note 293, at 18 (―The decisions in the Dobson and Bradey
cases are founded upon acts whose legislative history and purpose are not parallel to the
[FTCA].‖); Pet‘r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 10–11 (arguing that the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946 and the FTCA had a ―double purpose‖ of removing ―the
anachronistic doctrine of sovereign immunity to actions in tort . . . and . . . reliev[ing]
Congress of the burden of . . . private bills‖ that demonstrate a different policy than the
maritime statutes addressed by Dobson and Bradey).
301. Resp‘t Griggs Br., supra note 293, at 14.
302. See id. at 16.
303. See id. at 16–17.
304. See Pet‘r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 16–17.
305. See Resp‘t Griggs Br., supra note 293, at 19.
306. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 4–5, Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (No.
9) [hereinafter Pet‘r Feres Reply Br.]; Pet‘r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 12.
307. See Pet‘r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 11 (―Unlike Workmen‘s Compensation
statutes, there is nothing in the veterans‘ or servicemen‘s benefit statutes providing for
exclusiveness of remedy.‖).
308. Pet‘r Feres Br., supra note 293, at 19.
309. Id. at 20–21; Pet‘r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 11; Resp‘t Griggs Br., supra
note 293, at 10–11.
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the right to recover for injuries negligently inflicted upon them,‖310 that
giving new rights and benefits to America‘s World War II military
personnel resulted in ―the best disciplined [forces] this country has ever
produced,‖311 and that military discipline was adequately protected by the
Articles of War and courts martial.312 Jefferson contested that civilian
judges would have to evaluate military decisions, reasoning that ―no
military decision was involved in the performance of surgery.‖313
Responding to the argument that no American law allowed one member
of the armed forces to sue another, Griggs generally conceded the point,
but attributed it to a soldier‘s immunity akin to intra-family immunity.314
Griggs then reasoned that the government was liable on a respondeat
superior basis under the Restatement of Agency for such torts because,
―although a servant acting in the course of his employment might not be
liable to his wife or child by reason of his immunity, the master may
nevertheless be held liable.‖315 Jefferson argued that military personnel
were generally liable for torts at common law, noting a 1616 English case
where one active duty soldier sued another.316 Feres argued that ―American
Common Law did not refuse to recognize the right of a soldier to maintain
an action against another soldier for acts arising while on duty,‖317 but he
cited only encyclopedia passages that did not address suits by service
members for negligence.318

310. Pet‘r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 16; accord Resp‘t Griggs Br., supra note 293,
at 19. Feres‘ attorneys took a different tack, arguing that military discipline considerations
are not relevant to a soldier‘s widow who should be able to sue just as a convict‘s family
could sue even though the convict is barred. Pet‘r Feres Br., supra note 293, at 18–19
(citations omitted).
311. Pet‘r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 16.
312. Id.
313. Id. (citation omitted).
314. Resp‘t Griggs Br., supra note 293, at 21.
315. Id. at 21–22 (―A master or other principal is not liable for acts of a[n] . . . agent
which the agent is privileged to do although the principal himself would not be so
privileged, but he may be liable for an act as to which the agent has a personal immunity
from suit.‖ (quoting RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 217(2) (1933)). The brief then
quotes a comment to section 217: ―Thus if a servant while acting within the scope of
employment negligently injures his wife, the master is subject to liability.‖ Id. at 22
(quoting RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 217 cmt. b (1933).
316. See Pet‘r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 12–13 (citing Weaver v. Ward, (1616) 80
Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B.); Hobart 134).
317. Pet‘r Feres Reply Br., supra note 306, at 5.
318. Id. (citing and quoting 36 AM. JUR. Military § 119 (1941) (―An officer will,
however, be liable to the soldiers under him for acting in an illegal and unauthorized manner
toward them.‖); 6 C.J.S. Army & Navy § 36 (1937) (―An officer is not answerable for an
injury done within the scope of his authority, unless influenced by malice, corruption, or
cruelty . . . .‖)).
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B. The Feres Decision
The common fact in Feres, Griggs, and Jefferson was that ―each
claimant, while on active duty and not on furlough, sustained injury due to
negligence of others in the armed forces.‖319 Justice Jackson, writing for
the Court, squarely understood the issue to be one of ―statutory
construction‖—―whether the Tort Claims Act extend[ed] its remedy to one
sustaining ‗incident to the service‘ what under other circumstances would
be an actionable wrong.‖320 No legislative history addressed this issue.321
This made the task of statutory interpretation difficult, a point the Court
readily acknowledged.322
The Court recognized arguments that favored liability, including: the
FTCA granted district courts jurisdiction over negligence claims against the
United States;323 the FTCA contemplated liability for the torts of service
members acting within the line of duty;324 the FTCA did not include an
exception barring suits by service members, although prior bills had;325
and, finally, Brooks allowed FTCA suits by service members and ―it is
argued that much of its reasoning is as apt to impose liability in favor of a
man on duty as in favor of one on leave.‖326
The Court determined that the FTCA ―should be construed to fit, so far
as will comport with its words, into the entire statutory system of remedies
against the Government to make a workable, consistent and equitable
whole.‖327 It examined the history that led to passage of the FTCA, noting
the expansion of the federal government and the corresponding increase in
the number of ―remediless wrongs‖ caused by government negligence, the
growing number of private bills seeking compensation, the inadequacy and
capriciousness of the Congressional claims process, and Congress‘ prior
legislation allowing certain types of claims.328 It stated:

319. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950).
320. Id.
321. See id.
322. See id. (stating that because no committee reports or floor debates disclosed what
effect the statute was designed to have on the problem or even that Congress had the
problem in mind, no conclusion was above challenge).
323. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Supp. V 1946)).
324. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (Supp. V 1946)).
325. See id. at 138–39 (citing Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51 (1949)) (stating
that all but two of the eighteen tort claims bills introduced in Congress between 1925 and
1935 expressly denied recovery to members of the armed forces but that the present Tort
Claims Act made no exception).
326. Id. at 139. The Court rejected this argument because ―[t]he actual holding in the
Brooks case [could] support liability here only by ignoring the vital distinction there stated.
The injury to Brooks did not arise out of or in the course of military duty.‖ Id. at 146.
327. Id. at 139.
328. Id. at 139–40.
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At last, in connection with the Reorganization Act, [Congress] waived
immunity and transferred the burden of examining tort claims to the
courts. The primary purpose of the Act was to extend a remedy to those
who had been without; if it incidentally benefited those already well
provided for, it appears to have been unintentional. Congress was
suffering from no plague of private bills on the behalf of military and
naval personnel, because a comprehensive system of relief had been
authorized for them and their dependents by statute.329

The Court acknowledged that the FTCA granted jurisdiction to decide
tort cases, but noted, ―it remain[ed] for courts, in exercise of their
jurisdiction, to determine whether any claim [was] recognizable in law.‖330
It found that the FTCA‘s text provided ―the test of allowable claims, which
is, ‗The United States shall be liable . . . in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances . . . ,‘ with
certain exceptions not material here.‖331 It concluded that the plaintiffs‘
claims did not meet this test because the ―plaintiffs [could] point to no
liability of a ‗private individual‘ even remotely analogous to that which
they [were] asserting against the United States.‖332 No American precedent
had allowed service members to sue the government or their officers for
negligence, and no private person had power comparable to the federal
government‘s over its service members.333 The Court recognized that ―if
we consider relevant only a part of the circumstances and ignore the status
of both the wronged and the wrongdoer in these cases we find analogous
private liability,‖ but liability under the FTCA ―is that created by ‗all the
circumstances,‘ not that which a few of the circumstances might create.‖334
It concluded that no parallel private liability existed and ―no new one has
been created by . . . this Act.‖335
The opinion considered the ―law of the place‖ requirement of § 1346(b),
through which the FTCA adopts the substantive tort law of the state where
the tortious act took place.336 It noted that service members had no say
over where they were posted, that workers‘ compensation laws in ―most
states ha[d] abolished the common-law action for damages between
employer and employee and superseded it with workman‘s compensation
statutes which provide[d], in most instances, the sole basis of liability,‖ and
329. Id. at 140.
330. Id. at 140–41 (―Looking to the detail of the Act . . .‖); see also FDIC v. Meyer, 510
U.S. 471, 477 (1994); infra note 462.
331. Feres, 340 U.S. at 141 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (Supp. V 1946)).
332. Id.
333. See id. at 141–42.
334. Id. at 142.
335. Id.
336. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Supp. V 1946)).
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that state tort law varied widely as to liability, defenses, and damages.337
The Court concluded, ―[i]t would hardly be a rational plan of providing for
those disabled in service by others in service to leave them dependent upon
geographic considerations over which they have no control and to laws
which fluctuate in existence and value.‖338
The Court spoke to the ―distinctively federal‖339 relationship between the
government and its service members, citing its three-year-old Standard Oil
Co.340 decision that barred the government from recovering the damages it
incurred providing care to an injured soldier:
The considerations which [led] to [the Standard Oil Co.] decision
apply with even greater force to this case: ―. . . To whatever extent state
law may apply to govern the relations between soldiers or others in the
armed forces and persons outside them or nonfederal governmental
agencies, the scope, nature, legal incidents and consequences of the
relation between persons in service and the Government are
fundamentally derived from federal sources and governed by federal
authority.‖341

It observed that no federal law would allow a suit on these claims.342
―The Military Personnel Claims Act . . . permitted recovery in some
circumstances, but it specifically excluded claims of military personnel
‗incident to their service.‘‖343
The Court turned to the ―simple, certain, and uniform‖ compensation
system Congress had created ―for injuries or death of those in armed
services.‖344 After noting that the compensation system ―requires no
litigation,‖ and its ―recoveries compare extremely favorably with those
provided by most workman‘s compensation statutes,‖ it recounted the
substantial benefits given to Arthur Jefferson and Lt. Col. Griggs‘ estate.345
The Court found significance in Congress‘ failure to address the
intersection of the uniform compensation system and the FTCA346:
337. See id. at 142–43.
338. Id. at 143.
339. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
340. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947). See generally supra notes
165–67 and accompanying text.
341. Feres, 340 U.S. at 143–44 (quoting Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. at 305–06 (citing
Tarble‘s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871); Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487 (1885))).
342. Id. at 144 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 223b (1946).
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 145. The Court noted that Jefferson had received $3,645.50 at the time of
trial, and could expect to receive another $31,947, and that Mrs. Griggs could expect to
receive over $22,000, which was $7,000 more than the maximum permitted for wrongful
death in Illinois. Id.
346. See id. at 144. The Court set out four different possibilities: ―We might say that the
claimant may (a) enjoy both types of recovery, or (b) elect which to pursue, thereby waiving

PAUL FIGLEY 60.2

2010]

IN DEFENSE OF FERES

435

If Congress had contemplated that this Tort Act would be held to apply
in cases of this kind, it is difficult to see why it should have omitted any
provision to adjust these two types of remedy to each other. The absence
of any such adjustment is persuasive that there was no awareness that the
Act might be interpreted to permit recovery for injuries incident to
military service.347

The Court held without dissent that the FTCA did not provide a remedy
for ―injuries to servicemen where the injuries [arose] out of or [were] in the
course of activity incident to service.‖348 It noted that federal law defined
the relationship between service members and the government, concluding
that Congress had not authorized a new cause of action under varying state
law for injuries or death of service members.349 The Court stated, ―[w]e
cannot impute to Congress such a radical departure from established law in
the absence of express congressional command.‖350

the other, or (c) pursue both, crediting the larger liability with the proceeds of the smaller, or
(d) that the compensation and pension remedy excludes the tort remedy.‖ Id.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 146 (Justice Douglas did not join the Court‘s opinion but did concur in the
result). Courts consider a variety of factors in determining whether a claim arose incident to
service, with no single factor being dispositive. See, e.g., Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d
863, 867 (9th Cir. 2001); Richards v. United States, 176 F.3d 652, 655 (3d Cir. 1999).
These factors include the following:
(1) Whether the injury arose while a service member was on active duty. See
Kohn v. United States, 680 F.2d 922, 923–25 (2d Cir. 1982) (soldier shot by fellow
soldier); Chambers v. United States, 357 F.2d 224, 226–27 (8th Cir. 1966) (airman
drowned in base swimming pool).
(2) Whether the injury arose on a military situs. See Morey v. United States,
903 F.2d 880, 881–82 (1st Cir. 1990) (sailor fell off pier where his ship was
docked); Millang v. United States, 817 F.2d 533, 534–35 (9th Cir. 1987) (per
curiam) (off-duty marine run over by on-duty military police officer on military
installation). But see Dreier v. United States, 106 F.3d 844, 852 (9th Cir. 1996)
(ruling that the situs of the injury was not determinative).
(3) Whether the injury arose during a military activity. See Costo, 248 F.3d at
864, 868 (sailors drowned while participating in Navy-led recreational rafting trip);
Galligan v. City of Phila., 156 F. Supp. 2d 467, 473–74 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (West
Point cadet injured while attending an Army-Navy football game).
(4) Whether the service member was taking advantage of a privilege or
enjoying a benefit conferred as a result of military service. See Rayner v. United
States, 760 F.2d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (soldier injured during
elective surgery at military hospital); Herreman v. United States, 476 F.2d 234, 235
(7th Cir. 1973) (National Guardsman passenger on military flight).
(5) Whether the injury arose while the service member was subject to military
discipline or control. See Pringle v. United States, 208 F.3d 1220, 1222, 1226–27
(10th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (soldier injured when ejected from on-base social
club under the operational control of base commander); Stewart v. United States,
90 F.3d 102, 104–05 (4th Cir. 1996) (soldier injured in on-post automobile accident
while returning to quarters after mandatory physical training).
349. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
350. Id.
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C. Subsequent Supreme Court Decisions related to the Feres Doctrine
This section briefly summarizes the Supreme Court‘s decisions that deal
with the Feres doctrine and the related body of law declining to recognize
constitutional torts arising from military relationships. This short review is
provided to facilitate discussion of the criticisms that have been directed at
the Feres decision.
1.

United States v. Brown
In United States v. Brown,351 the Supreme Court held that Feres does not
bar claims of veterans that arise after they have left military service.352
Noting that the veteran was injured in a Veterans‘ Administration hospital
seven years after his discharge, the Court explained that ―[t]he injury . . .
was not incurred while [Brown] was on active duty or subject to military
discipline. The injury occurred after his discharge, while he enjoyed a
civilian status.‖353 The Court concluded that this injury did not arise
incident-to-service and was not barred by Feres.354 In reaching such a
conclusion, the Court explained its Feres decision, stating:
The peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the
effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme
results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed
for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of
military duty, led the Court to read that Act as excluding claims of that
character.355

Justices Reed and Minton joined in Justice Black‘s dissent.356
2.

Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States
In Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States,357 the Court
considered a third-party indemnity action against the United States brought
by the manufacturer of an aircraft ejection system that injured a National
Guard pilot.358 The issue was complicated by the holding in United States
v. Yellow Cab Co.359 that the FTCA allows third party actions against the

351. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
352. Id. at 113.
353. Id. at 112.
354. Id. at 113.
355. Id. at 112.
356. Id. at 113 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black argued, ―[w]e have previously held,
I think correctly, that a soldier injured in a hospital cannot also sue for damages under the
Tort Claims Act. . . . To permit a veteran to recover damages . . . seems like an unjustifiable
discrimination which the Act does not require.‖ Id. at 114.
357. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
358. Id. at 667.
359. 340 U.S. 543 (1951).
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United States for indemnity and contribution.360 Because of the tension
between Yellow Cab and Feres, the Court found it ―necessary . . . to
examine the rationale of Feres to determine . . . if . . . [Stencel Aero
Engineering Corp.‘s] claim would circumvent the purposes of the Act.‖361
The Court recounted Feres‘ point that the government‘s relationship to its
service members ―is unlike any relationship between private individuals,‖
creating ―at least a surface anomaly in applying‖ the FTCA‘s private
person liability requirement.362 It identified three rationales or factors for
Feres‘ conclusion that Congress had not intended to allow incident-toservice claims:
First, the relationship between the Government and members of its
Armed Forces is ―‗distinctively federal in character‘‖ . . . . Second, the
Veterans‘ Benefits Act establishes, as a substitute for tort liability, a
statutory ―no fault‖ compensation scheme which provides generous
pensions to injured servicemen, without regard to any negligence
attributable to the Government. . . . [T]hird[,] . . . the peculiar and
special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the
maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that
might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for
negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of
military duty . . . .363

It then addressed each rationale.364 It concluded that ―[t]he factors
considered by the Feres court are largely applicable in this type of case as
well,‖ and that suit was barred.365
Justice Marshall filed a dissent, in which Justice Brennan concurred,
stating: ―I cannot agree that that narrow, judicially created exception to the
waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the Act should be extended to
any category of litigation other than suits against the Government by
active-duty servicemen based on injuries incurred while on duty.‖366

360. Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp., 431 U.S. at 669–70 (citing Yellow Cab, 340 U.S. 543,
and explaining its holding).
361. Id. at 670.
362. Id. at 670–71 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135,
141–42 (1950)).
363. Id. at 671–72 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
364. Id. at 672–73 (finding that the government-federal contractor relationship is federal,
the military compensation system ―provides an upper limit‖ to the government‘s potential
liability, and trial of the contractor‘s suit would have the same effect on military discipline
as a suit by the airman, involving second-guessing orders and testimony by service members
about one another‘s decisions).
365. Id. at 674.
366. Id. at 674 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

PAUL FIGLEY 60.2

438

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:393

3.

Chappell v. Wallace
In Chappell v. Wallace,367 the Supreme Court unanimously held that no
cause of action existed under the Constitution for tort suits by service
members against other service members.368 Five sailors alleged that seven
of their superior officers had discriminated against them because of their
race.369 The Court reasoned that a Constitutional cause of action will not
be recognized when ―‗special factors counseling hesitation‘ are present,‖370
and that ―[t]he ‗special factors‘ that bear on the propriety of respondents‘
Bivens action also formed the basis of this Court‘s decision in Feres.‖371
These factors or rationales included ―the unique relationship between the
Government and military personnel,‖ the uniform compensation system,
and the disruption such suits would have on military discipline.372 The
Court declined to recognize a Constitutional cause of action under these
circumstances because ―‗special factors counseling hesitation‘ [were]
present‖ in that Congress had appropriately regulated the military and the
rights of service members,373 and ―‗courts are ill-equipped to determine the
impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority
might have.‘‖374
4.

United States v. Shearer
In United States v. Shearer,375 the Supreme Court expanded the Feres
doctrine to encompass situations other than claims that met the traditional
incident-to-service test,376 holding that Feres barred an FTCA suit against
the government for the off-base, off-duty murder of one service member by
367. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
368. Id. at 305.
369. Id. at 297.
370. Id. at 298 (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983); Carlson v. Green, 446
U.S. 14, 18 (1980); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971)).
371. Id.
372. Id. at 299. The Court stated:
As the Court has since recognized, ―[i]n the last analysis, Feres seems best
explained by the ‗peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors,
[and] the effects on the maintenance of such suits on discipline . . . .‘‖ United
States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963), quoting United States v. Brown, 348
U.S. 110, 112 (1954). . . . Although this case concerns the limitations on the type
of non-statutory damages remedy recognized in Bivens, rather than Congress‘
intent in enacting the [FTCA], the Court‘s analysis in Feres guides our analysis in
this case.
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
373. Id. at 298, 302–04.
374. Id. at 305 (quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military,
37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 187 (1962)).
375. 473 U.S. 52 (1985).
376. See supra notes 365–369 (discussing incident-to-service test).
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another, even though the government knew that the murderer had been
convicted of a prior manslaughter overseas.377 The plaintiff alleged
government negligence because ―although the Army knew that [the
murderer] was dangerous, it ‗negligently and carelessly failed to exert a
reasonably sufficient control over‘ him and ‗failed to warn other persons
that he was at large.‘‖378
The Court reasoned that the crux of the Feres doctrine is the ―peculiar
and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the
maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might
obtain if suits . . . were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts
committed in the course of military duty.‖379 It concluded that the
plaintiff‘s allegation of negligent personnel practices relating to the
murderer and the Army‘s failure to warn others about him ―[struck] at the
core of these concerns.‖380 Any suit would ―call[] into question basic
choices about the discipline, supervision, and control of a serviceman,‖ and
require ―commanding officers . . . to convince a civilian court of the
wisdom of a wide range of [‗complex, subtle, and professional‘] military
and disciplinary decisions.‖381 The Court ruled that these claims, like those
in Feres and Stencel, ―were the type of claims that, if generally permitted,
would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense of
military discipline and effectiveness.‖382 It held that such claims were
outside what Congress had authorized when it enacted the FTCA.383 The
eight justices deciding the case concurred in the Court‘s analysis of the
Feres issue.384
5.

United States v. Johnson
In United States v. Johnson,385 the Supreme Court held that the Feres
doctrine barred a tort suit by members of the Coast Guard injured in a
377. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 53–54, 59. Shearer also addressed the FTCA‘s assault and
battery exception. Id. at 54–57 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982)). That discussion is
not relevant to this paper.
378. Id. at 54.
379. Id. at 57 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S.
150, 162 (1963) (quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954))).
380. Id. at 58. The Court added in a footnote that, ―[a]lthough no longer controlling,
other factors mentioned in Feres are present here. It would be anomalous for the
Government‘s duty to supervise servicemen to depend on the local law of the various states,
and the record shows that Private Shearer‘s dependents are entitled to statutory veterans‘
benefits.‖ Id. at 58 n.4 (citations omitted).
381. Id. at 58 (citations omitted).
382. Id. at 59.
383. See id.
384. See id. at 59–60 (Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens concurred in Part II-B
regarding the Feres opinion, and Justice Marshall also concurred separately in Part II-B).
385. 481 U.S. 681 (1987).
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helicopter crash during a rescue mission although the tortfeasor, an FAA
air traffic controller, was not a member of the military.386 Rejecting an
Eleventh Circuit test that provided ―when negligence is alleged on the part
of a Federal Government employee who is not a member of the
military, . . . the propriety of a suit should be determined by examining the
rationales that underlie the Feres doctrine,‖387 the Court reaffirmed its
Feres holding that the FTCA does not encompass claims ―for injuries that
[arose] out of or [were] in the course of activity incident to service.‖ 388 It
also rejected the argument that the civilian nature of the tortfeasor was
relevant to that inquiry.389 The Court found that the three broad rationales
for the Feres doctrine applied to the Johnson facts390: the distinctively
federal nature of the military relationship between service members and the
government;391 the congressionally-established system of ―generous
statutory disability and death benefits‖;392 and the disruption of military
discipline and ―commitment essential to effective service‖ that would flow
from
allowing
tort
suits
by
service
members.393
It noted that Johnson had been on a rescue mission as part of his military
service and in his military status, that his wife had received administrative
compensation, and that any suit would likely raise military discipline
issues.394 Accordingly, the case came ―within the heart of the Feres
doctrine as it consistently ha[d] been articulated.‖395
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined in Justice Scalia‘s
dissent.396 Justice Scalia argued that, with the exception of the military
discipline concern first noted in Brown, the Court had disavowed the
rationales it had identified in support of the Feres decision, and that they
did not justify the result.397 He argued that the ―parallel private liability‖
rationale failed because it would render superfluous some explicit
exceptions to the FTCA that involve purely federal activities, such as postal
matters and combatant activities, and because the Court had subsequently

386. Id. at 682–83, 692.
387. Id. at 684.
388. Id. at 686 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (―This Court has
never deviated from this characterization of the Feres bar.‖).
389. Id. at 686–88.
390. Id. at 688.
391. Id. at 689 (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (quoting United States
v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947))).
392. Id. (citing UNIFORMED SERVICES ALMANAC (L. Sharff & S. Gordon eds., 1985)).
393. Id. at 690–91 (citing United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985)).
394. Id. at 691–92.
395. Id. at 692.
396. Id. at 692 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
397. Id. at 693–95.
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rejected the ―parallel private liability‖ requirement.398 He also criticized
the second rationale, that claims arising within the distinctively federal
military relationship should not be judged by state tort law.399 Justice
Scalia reasoned it was more unfair to deny service members any recovery
than it was to subject them to varying state laws; the purported ―need for
uniformity‖ was belied by allowing civilians, prisoners,400 and
―servicemen . . . [injured] not incident to service‖ to sue; and ―it [was]
difficult to explain why uniformity . . . [was] indispensable for the military,
but not for the many other federal departments and agencies.‖401 He argued
that the third rationale—the existence of a uniform compensation system—
was undermined because the Court had allowed FTCA suits by veterans
and service members for injuries that were not incurred incident to service
even though both veterans and service members receive administrative
compensation.402 He further noted that the Court had recognized that
neither the Veterans Benefit Act nor the FTCA provided that remedies
under the veterans‘ statute were exclusive.403 Finally, Justice Scalia argued
that Feres‘ attempt ―to make ‗the entire statutory system of remedies
against the Government . . . a workable, consistent and equitable whole,‘‖
had failed,404 and that ―‗[t]here [was] no justification for this Court to read
exemptions into the Act beyond those provided by Congress.‘‖405
6.

United States v. Stanley
In United States v. Stanley,406 a former soldier alleged that his
constitutional rights were violated when he unwittingly participated in an
LSD drug testing program during his military service.407 The Court
reaffirmed its conclusion in Chappell that no constitutional tort remedy was
available when a service member‘s injury arose out of or in the course of
activity incident-to-service, and clarified that the holding applied even

398. Id. (citing Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957); Indian Towing
Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 66–69 (1955)).
399. Id. at 695–96.
400. Id. at 695–96 (―We have abandoned this peculiar rule of solicitude in allowing
federal prisoners (who have no more control over their geographical location than
servicemen) to recover under the FTCA for injuries caused by the negligence of prison
authorities.‖ (citing United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963))).
401. Id. (quoting Stencel Aero Eng‘g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 675 (1977)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)).
402. Id. at 697–98 (citing Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949); United States
v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 111 (1951)).
403. Id. at 697 (citing Brooks, 337 U.S. at 53).
404. Id. at 701 (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950)).
405. Id. at 702 (quoting Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 320 (1957)).
406. 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
407. Id. at 671–72.
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though suit had been brought against government employees other than the
plaintiff‘s superior officers.408 The same ―‗special factors counseling
hesitation [in Chappell]‘—‘the unique disciplinary structure of the Military
Establishment and Congress‘ activity in the field,‘‖ counseled hesitation in
Stanley.409 The Court found ―no reason‖ to adopt a different test for service
members‘ claims for constitutional torts than for FTCA suits.410 The Court
held that Stanley had no constitutional cause of action because his claim
arose incident to his military service.411 The majority opinion, written by
Justice Scalia, did not address Stanley‘s FTCA claims against the United
States, other than to reject them on procedural grounds as not within the
interlocutory order that was appealed to the circuit court.412
Justice O‘Connor concurred in part and dissented in part.413 While
agreeing that service members had no remedy for constitutional torts that
arise incident to military service, she would have recognized a
constitutional cause of action where ―conduct of the type alleged in
[Stanley was] so far beyond the bounds of human decency that as a matter
of law it simply cannot be considered a part of the military mission.‖414
Justice Brennan wrote a separate dissent, joined by Justice Marshall and
in part by Justice Stevens.415 Justice Brennan argued that the majority had
inappropriately granted absolute immunity to the civilian officials who had
violated Stanley‘s rights,416 and improperly expanded the holding of
Wallace v. Chappell.417 He urged, in the absence of a command
relationship or clear showing that military discipline would be

408. Id. at 680–81 (citations omitted).
409. Id. at 683–84 (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983)).
410. Id. at 681–83. The Court stated:
A test for liability that depends on the extent to which particular suits would call
into question military discipline and decisionmaking would itself require judicial
inquiry into, and hence intrusion upon, military matters. Whether a case implicates
those concerns would often be problematic, raising the prospect of compelled
depositions and trial testimony by military officers concerning the details of their
military commands. Even putting aside the risk of erroneous judicial conclusions
(which would becloud military decisionmaking), the mere process of arriving at
correct conclusions would disrupt the military regime. The ―incident to service‖
test, by contrast, provides a line that is relatively clear and that can be discerned
with less extensive inquiry into military matters.
Id. at 682–83.
411. Id. at 680.
412. Id. at 676–78. Both dissents concurred in this result. Id. at 686 n.1 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 708 (O‘Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
413. Id. at 708 (O‘Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
414. Id. at 708–10.
415. Id. at 686 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
416. Id. at 693–98.
417. Id. at 700–02.
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undermined,418 that no factor counseled hesitation to the recognition of a
constitutional cause of action on these facts.419
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT‘S FERES DECISION
This Part analyzes the Feres decision and the criticisms directed at it. It
evaluates the Court‘s reasoning and the factors that support its conclusion.
It then considers the criticisms of the opinion, including those that directly
challenge the reasoning of Feres, and those that independently object to its
analysis. Finally, it addresses characterizations of the Feres decision as
judicially creating an exception to the FTCA, usurping the role of
Congress, and fostering injustice.
A. Evaluating the Feres Conclusion
The historical circumstances and the state of the law when Congress
enacted the Legislative Reform Act of 1946 provide substantial support for
Feres‘ conclusion that Congress did not intend for the FTCA to cover
claims arising from injuries to service-members incident-to-service. The
single issue before the Court in Feres was ―whether the Tort Claims Act
extend[ed] its remedy to one sustaining ‗incident to the service‘ what under
other circumstances would be an actionable wrong.‖420 The Court
approached its task with the stated purpose of deciding that issue in
accordance with what Congress intended.421 The task was difficult because
there was no definitive legislative history on the issue.422
The Court laid out a strong affirmative case for the proposition that when
Congress enacted the FTCA it did not intend to allow suit for injuries that
were incurred incident to military service. The opinion reviewed the ―long
effort‖ that led to the enactment of the FTCA.423 It recognized that a key
purpose of the Act was to relieve Congress of the burden of private bills,
but noted that private bills on behalf of service members were not a
significant part of that problem.424 The Court explained that the courts are
―to determine whether any claim is recognizable in law.‖425 It noted that
the text of the FTCA subjected the government to liability only ―‗to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,‘‖ and that no

418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.

Id. at 703–06.
Id. at 706–08.
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950).
Id. at 138, 146.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 141–42.
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American precedent supported liability under circumstances akin to those
of the government-service member relationship.426 The Court addressed
the FTCA‘s jurisdictional requirement that liability be assessed under the
substantive state tort law of the place of the wrongful act, noted that state
tort law and workers‘ compensation law vary widely, and concluded that it
would not have been rational to subject claims brought against the federal
government by members of its military to such varied rules. 427 The Court
spoke to the ―distinctively federal‖ relationship between the government
and service members that is ―fundamentally derived from federal sources
and governed by federal authority,‖ and noted that federal law did not
provide ―a recovery such as plaintiffs seek‖ because the Military Personnel
Claims Act ―specifically excluded claims of military personnel ‗incident to
their service.‘‖428 It addressed the ―simple, certain, and uniform‖
compensation programs Congress had created for veterans and service
members and reasoned that, had Congress intended for service members to
recover under the FTCA, it would have directed how a tort recovery would
or would not alter the administrative remedy.429
Although not mentioned in its opinion, the Feres Court was aware of a
significant body of law that held that service members could not bring suit
for in-service injuries under statutes that waived the United States‘ tort
sovereign immunity in specific circumstances. Second Circuit decisions in
1928430 and 1945431 (the latter written by Judge Learned Hand) held that the
Public Vessels Act did not authorize service members to sue for in-service
injuries even though the language of the statute did not exclude such
liability432:
If it had been the purpose to change that policy as respects officers and
seamen of the navy injured by the unseaworthiness of a public vessel, or
by the fault of one another, because that is what in the end it comes to,
we cannot think it would have been left to such general language . . . .433

A similar line of cases barred suits seeking compensation for in-service
injuries to service members under the Railroad Control Act‘s waiver of
federal sovereign immunity.434 This body of law was presented to the
426. Id.
427. Id. at 142–43.
428. Id. at 143–44 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301,
305–06 (1947) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (Supp. IV 1946); Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487
(1885); Tarble‘s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871)).
429. Id. at 144–45.
430. Dobson v. United States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928).
431. Bradey v. United States, 151 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1945).
432. Id. at 743; Dobson, 27 F.2d at 809.
433. Dobson, 27 F.2d at 809.
434. See Sandoval v. Davis, 278 F. 968, 969–970 (N.D. Ohio 1922), aff’d per curiam,
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Court in Feres435 and Brooks.436 The Court alluded to it in the Brooks
opinion.437
One other factor strongly supports the Court‘s conclusion. Throughout
the legislative build-up to the enactment of the FTCA, Congress had
contemplated that any general tort claims bill would place caps or limits on
the damages that could be recovered. Many of the bills proposed in the
1920s and 1930s included maximum amounts to be paid.438 Up to the eve
of the FTCA‘s enactment, the legislative proposals of the 1940s limited
damages to $7,500 or $10,000.439 President Roosevelt‘s 1942 proposal
included a limit of $7,500.440 Payments under the military compensation
system were substantially higher than these limits.441 Because it had
already provided service members with an assured, no-fault administrative
remedy that was larger than the tort remedy under consideration, it is
unlikely that Congress intended to allow service members to also pursue a
tort remedy under the FTCA.
On the face of its opinion and unanimous holding, the Court made a
compelling explanation why ―Congress, in drafting this Act, [had not]

288 F. 56 (6th Cir. 1923); Seidel v. Dir. Gen. of R.Rs., 89 So. 308 (La. 1921); Moon v.
Hines, 87 So. 603 (Ala. 1921).
435. U.S. Griggs Br., supra note 274, at 14–19.
436. U.S. Brooks Br., supra note 60, at 6, 10–18.
437. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949).
438. See S. 1043, 74th Cong. §§ 1(a), 202(b) (1935) ($50,000 for property; $7500 for
personal injury or death); S. 1833, 73d Cong. §§ 1(a)–(b), 201(a), 202(b) (1933) ($50,000
for property; $7,500 for personal injury or death); H.R. 129, 73d Cong.
§ 2(b)(1) (1933) ($50,000 for property; $10,000 for personal injury or death);
S. 4567, 72d Cong. §§ 1(a)–(b), 201(a), 202(b) (1932) (same); S. 211, 72d Cong.
§§ 1(a), (c), 201(a), 202(b) (1931) (same); H.R. 5065, 72d Cong. §§ 1(a), (c), 203(b)(3)
(1931) ($50,000 for property; $10,000 for personal injury or death);
H.R. 17168, 71st Cong. §§ 1, 201(a) (1931) ($50,000 for property; $7,500 for personal
injury or death); H.R. 16429, 71st Cong. §§ 1, 21(a) (1931) (same); H.R. 15428, 71st Cong.
§§ 1(a), 201(a), 202(a) (1930) (same); S. 4377, 71st Cong. §§ 1(a), (201)(a), 202(a) (1930)
(same); H.R. 9285, 70th Cong. §§ 4, 201(a), 202(a) (1928) ($10,000 for property; $7,500 for
personal injury or death); S. 1912, 69th Cong. §§ 2, 3 (1926) ($5,000 for property and
personal injury or death); H.R. 6716, 69th Cong. §§ 4, 204(a)(5), 204(b)(3) (1926) ($10,000
for property; $5,000 for total disability or death); H.R. 12178, 68th Cong. § 5 (1925) ($5000
for personal injury or death). Four bills of that era did not cap damages. See H.R. 2028,
74th
Cong.
(1935);
H.R. 8561, 73d Cong. (1934); H.R. 8914, 69th Cong. (1926); H.R. 12179, 68th Cong.
(1925).
439. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 2 ($7,500); H.R.
REP. NO. 79-1287, at 4 (1945) ($10,000); S. REP. NO. 77-1196, at 2, 6 (1942) ($10,000);
H.R. REP. NO. 76-2428, at 4 (1940) ($7,500).
440. See H.R. DOC. NO. 77-562, at 2 (1942) ($7,500).
441. See, e.g., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 145 (1950) (noting that Arthur
Jefferson had received $3,645 in government benefits prior to trial and could expect to
receive another $31,947, and that Mrs. Griggs could expect to receive over $22,000 in
government benefits); S. DOC. NO. 80-179, at 1–3 (1948) (noting monthly payments of $168
made to Lee Jones Cardy‘s wife and mother following his 1944 death).
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created a new cause of action dependent on local law for service-connected
injuries or death due to negligence.‖442 It could not ―impute to Congress
such a radical departure from established law in the absence of express
congressional command.‖443 The Court correctly found that Congress did
not intend for the FTCA to allow service members to sue for injuries that
arose incident to military service.444
B. Arguments Against the Feres Decision
Opponents of Feres raise a number of criticisms of the decision.445
Some directly attack the Court‘s explanation. Others raise independent
reasons why the Court must be considered mistaken. A third set
characterizes the decision in pejorative terms.
1.

Direct Challenges to Feres’ Line of Analysis
a.

The FTCA Requires Comparable Private Person Parallel Liability

In Feres the Court concluded, ―plaintiffs can point to no liability of a
‗private individual‘ even remotely analogous to that which they are
asserting against the United States.‖446 This conclusion has been
challenged on the ground that the military does things that private
individuals do, and ―[a]pplying the Court‘s logic, because private entities
can be held liable for negligent provision of medical, legal, retail,
transportation, and recreational services, the United States could, similarly,
be liable for the negligent provision of such services.‖447 This argument
falls into the logical trap of finding ―analogous private liability‖ by
considering only some circumstances and ignoring ―the status of both the
wronged and the wrongdoer.‖448 The Court addressed and rejected this
argument because liability under the FTCA ―is that created by ‗all the

442. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
443. See id. Justice Douglas concurred in the result.
444. See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 35, §§ 1-5A, 5A.05 (―There is little
evidence that Feres incorrectly determined Congressional intent on the matter . . . .‖); see
also Gregory C. Sisk, Teaching Litigation with the Federal Government, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC.
275, 287 (1999) (arguing that ―the Feres Court was probably correct [fifty years ago] in
divining the mood of the times, confirming . . . that era‘s [deference] toward military
demands and the military command structure, and recognizing that Congress very likely
would have excepted military personnel from the [Act] . . . had it anticipated . . . such
claims‖).
445. This article responds to those arguments that are most prominent or recent.
446. 340 U.S. at 141.
447. Dierdre G. Brou, Alternatives to the Judicially Promulgated Feres Doctrine,
192 MIL. L. REV. 1, 43–44 (2007).
448. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 142.
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circumstances,‘ not that which a few of the circumstances might create.‖ 449
Tort liability often turns on the particular relationship between the plaintiff
and the defendant.450
In his Johnson dissent, Justice Scalia argued that Feres was mistaken to
recognize an FTCA parallel private liability requirement.451 First, he
argued such a requirement would mean that some of the FTCA‘s
exceptions were ―superfluous, since private individuals typically do not, for
example, transmit postal matter, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b), collect taxes or
customs duties, § 2680(c), impose quarantines, § 2680(f), or regulate the
monetary system, § 2680(i).‖452 Second, he argued the Court had
subsequently rejected any ―‗parallel private liability‘ requirement.‖453
The former argument fails because the FTCA does include redundant
defenses. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) bars claims arising from both
―misrepresentation‖ and ―deceit,‖ and the discretionary function exception
of § 2680(a) would bar any claim arising from either ―the imposition . . . of
a quarantine,‖ protected by § 2680(f), or ―the regulation of the monetary
system,‖
protected
by
§ 2680(i).454 Nor was it irrational for Congress to include overlapping
defenses.455
The latter argument fails because the ―private person‖ liability
requirement is a textual part of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), the FTCA‘s
jurisdictional grant.456 As the Court recognized in Feres, one of its tasks
was to determine whether a ―claim is recognizable in law.‖457 In FDIC v.
Meyer,458 the Court analyzed the language of the jurisdictional grant in very
similar terms:

449. Id.
450. See, e.g., Matheny v. United States, 469 F.3d 1093, 1094–95 (7th Cir. 2006)
(finding that the Indiana Recreational Use Statute foreclosed recovery by a visitor injured
while sled-riding in a national park); Leigh v. NASA, 860 F.2d 652, 652–53 (5th Cir. 1988)
(holding that the Louisiana statutory employer doctrine barred suit by employee of a
subcontractor injured while testing an external tank of the space shuttle).
451. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 694–95 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b), (c), (f), (i) (1982)).
452. See id. at 694.
453. Id. at 694–95 (citing Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957);
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 66–69 (1955)).
454. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), (f), (h), (i) (2006).
455. Certainly the Postal Exception, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (2006), is not superfluous when
juxtaposed with the private person liability requirement. The government is still liable for
negligently leaving mail in a hazardous spot. See Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481,
489–92 (2006).
456. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006).
457. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141 (1950).
458. 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
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Section 1346(b) grants the federal district courts jurisdiction over a
certain category of claims for which the United States has waived its
sovereign immunity and ―render[ed]‖ itself liable. Richards v. United
States, 369 U.S. 1, 6 . . . (1962). This category includes claims that are:
―[1] against the United States, [2] for money damages, . . .
[3] for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
[4] caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the Government [5] while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, [6] under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred.‖ 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b).
A claim comes within this jurisdictional grant—and thus is
―cognizable‖ under § 1346(b)—if it is actionable under § 1346(b). And
a claim is actionable under § 1346(b) if it alleges the six elements
outlined above.459

Thus, private person liability is an element of any FTCA claim. 460 Where a
private person might perform the same task, that requirement can be met.461
But where an activity is not something a private person could do, the
requirement for private person liability cannot be met and the claim is not
cognizable under the FTCA.462
459. Id. at 477 (alterations in original).
460. See id. at 477–78 (holding that § 1346(b) does not waive sovereign immunity for
constitutional tort claims because ―federal law, not state law, provides the source of liability
for a claim alleging the deprivation of a federal constitutional right‖);
H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 5 (1945); see also United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 44 (2005)
(recognizing that § 1346(b)(1) waives sovereign immunity under circumstances where the
United States if a private person, rather than the United States if a state or municipal entity,
would be liable and that the Court had consistently adhered to the private person standard).
See generally Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972) (citing § 1346(b)) (holding that because
the jurisdictional grant is for claims for a ―negligent or wrongful act or omission,‖ claims for
strict or absolute liability cannot be brought under the FTCA)); Peak v. Small Bus. Admin.,
660 F.2d 375, 378 (8th Cir. 1981) (―The holding in Laird did not indicate that such claims
are not governed by the provisions of the FTCA, but simply that they are barred by the
provisions of the FTCA. The practical effect . . . is the same as if Congress had included it
as an exemption under section 2680.‖).
461. See Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 315, 319 (1957) (negligence by
people fighting forest fire); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61,
61–62, 66–69 (1955) (failure to keep lighthouse repaired).
462. C.P. Chem. Co. v. United States, 810 F.2d 34, 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1987) (barring suit
challenging ban on formaldehyde-emitting foam insulation and stating that the plain
meaning of § 1346(b) is that the United States cannot be held liable if there is no
comparable cause of action against a private citizen); Jayvee Brand, Inc. v. United States,
721 F.2d 385, 387, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (affirming dismissal of suit by pajama
manufacturers challenging ban on flame retardant because a quasi-legislative or quasiadjudicative action by an agency of the federal government is not the type of action that
private persons could engage in); Pate v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 2d 62, 63, 76 (D.D.C.
2004) (barring suit alleging U.S. Parole Commission failed to hold hearings in conformity
with its regulations); see also Dorking Genetics v. United States, 76 F.3d 1261, 1264 (2d
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Finally, some critics have asserted that the Court erred in discussing
private person liability by ―ignor[ing] other provisions of the FTCA . . .
which opened to liability a number of areas where parallel private rights of
action did not previously exist, including the ‗transmi[ssion of] postal
matter, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b), collect[ion of] taxes or custom duties, §
2680(c),
impos[ition
of]
quarantines,
§ 2680(f), [and regulation of] the monetary system, § 2680(i).‘‖463 This
assertion is apparently based on a misreading of Justice Scalia‘s argument
that a private person liability requirement would render some of the
FTCA‘s exceptions superfluous because they protected purely
governmental activity.464
The cited provisions, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2680(b), (c), (f), and (i) are exceptions to the FTCA‘s general waiver of
sovereign immunity.465 As such, they do the opposite of opening the
United States to liability for transmitting postal matter, collecting taxes,
imposing quarantines, or regulating the monetary system: they exclude
such claims from the FTCA.
b. State Law and the Federal Relationship between Service Members
and the United States
Feres supported its conclusion that Congress did not intend to include
claims arising incident-to-service by noting that ―[i]t would hardly be a
rational plan‖ to have claims of service members decided under widely
varying state law, as the FTCA would require, when the relationship
between service members and the government was ―distinctively
federal.‖466 In response it is argued that the FTCA itself burdens the
military relationship with state tort law:
Cir. 1996) (barring suit alleging government failure to stop export of diseased cattle and
holding that the breach of such a duty, assuming it existed, is not cognizable under the
FTCA); Art Metal-U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 753 F.2d 1151, 1152–55 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(barring suit alleging that the General Services Administration failed to follow government
regulations when it debarred plaintiff from federal contracts).
463. Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (Ferguson, J., dissenting)
(alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 694 (1987) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)); see also Turley, supra note 9, at 16 (noting the same examples and stating
that ―[w]hile the Feres Court relied on the fact that there was no parallel private right of
action where service members could sue their employer, ‗[t]his ignores other provisions of
the FTCA . . . which opened to liability a number of areas where parallel private rights of
action did not previously exist‘‖ (alterations in original) (quoting Costo, 248 F.3d at 874)).
464. Johnson v. United States, 481 U.S. 681, 694 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 2680 (b), (c), (f), (i) (1982)).
465. Section 2680 begins, ―Exceptions: The provisions of this chapter and section
1346(b) of this title shall not apply to— . . . .‖ 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2006).
466. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 143 (1950) (quoting United States v. Standard
Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947)). The Court reasoned:
That the geography of an injury should select the law to be applied to his tort
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State law . . . intrudes upon the relationship between the Government
and its armed forces [because] when civilians sue . . . for injuries
inflicted by . . . service members[,] [s]tate law . . . provid[es] the
substantive tort law to establish the United States‘ [FTCA] liability for
its employees‘ actions. . . . Civilians sue under the [FTCA] and, as a
result, . . . service members face tort liability. Because tort law varies
from state to state, this can lead to varying tort standards for . . . service
members.467

This argument fails for three reasons. First, service members would not
face tort liability because the FTCA specifically grants immunity to all
federal employees for any tort that is cognizable under the Act. 468 Second,
leaving aside the service members‘ immunity, in an FTCA suit for service
member negligence, the service member and the United States would both
be on the defense side, with no strain on their relationship caused by
varying state tort law. Third, the argument does not address the Court‘s
point: absent some strong indication to the contrary, it is unlikely that
Congress would have set up a system where similar members of the
military exposed to the same danger and suffering similar injuries would
receive widely varying remedies under state tort law.469
Justice Scalia argues:
[I]t is difficult to explain why uniformity (assuming our rule were
achieving it) is indispensable for the military, but not for the many other
federal departments and agencies that can be sued under the FTCA for
the negligent performance of their ―unique, nationwide function[s],‖ . . .
including, as we have noted, the federal prison system which may be
sued under varying state laws by its inmates.470

claims makes no sense. We cannot ignore the fact that most states have abolished
the common-law action for damages between employer and employee and
superseded it with workman‘s compensation statutes which provide, in most
instances, the sole basis of liability.
Id.
467. Brou, supra note 447, at 40–41.
468. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (2006).
469. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 142–44. In Molsbergen v. United States, 757 F.2d 1016 (9th
Cir. 1985), the court held that state law determines whether the government owed a duty to
inform a former soldier that he had been exposed to radiation with thousands of others
during service, assuming that the government had no notice that radiation was hazardous
prior to his discharge. Id. at 1019–20. Because the service member was domiciled in
California after discharge, the court determined that California law would apply to claims
regarding his injury. Id. at 1020.
470. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 696 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Stencel Aero
Eng‘g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 675 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting)); see also
Brou, supra note 447, at 41–42. But see United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149 (1966)
(holding federal prisoner could not sue under the FTCA for injuries incurred working for
Prison Industries, Inc.).
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The answer is that the military needs to be a cohesive organization to a
much greater extent than other federal agencies and in a categorically
different way than the Bureau of Prisons: ―The military constitutes a
specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the
civilian.‖471 Trust and goodwill among soldiers, sailors, and airmen are
important to military success.472
A uniform system of remedies fosters trust and goodwill. The FTCA
bars claims that arise in foreign countries473 or in combatant activities.474 If
three service-member amputees share a military hospital ward—one having
lost a leg when his helicopter was shot down by the Taliban, one suffering
the same loss in a military transport accident in Germany, and one in a
military training flight in Kansas—each of them will have the full panoply
of service members‘ and veterans‘ benefits.475 Those who suffered their
loss in combat or overseas could not sue under the FTCA because the Act‘s
exceptions bar those claims.476 If the one injured in Kansas could bring a
FTCA suit under Kansas tort law he would have a much larger potential
remedy, the others would know it, and may well feel unfairly treated.477
Concern about providing such disparate treatment for similarly situated
members of the military led President Truman to veto the Cardy private
relief bill on the day he signed the FTCA into law, stating that ―it would
grant to the estate a special benefit denied to the estates of other members
of the armed forces where the facts are similar.‖478 As President
471. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953); see also United States v. Stanley,
483 U.S. 669, 679 (1987) (―We found ‗factors counseling hesitation‘ in ‗[t]he need for
special regulations in relation to military discipline, and the consequent need and
justification for a special and exclusive system of military justice . . . .‘‖ (alterations in
original) (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983))).
472. See Kathryn R. Burke, The Privacy Penumbra and Adultery: Does Military
Necessity Justify an Adultery Regulation and What Will It Take for the Court to Declare It
Unconstitutional?, 19 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL‘Y 301, 321 (1997); Sam Nunn, The
Fundamental Principles of the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence in Military Cases, ARMY
LAW. Jan. 1995, at 27, 28–30.
473. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2006).
474. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2006).
475. See discussion supra Part I.B(1).
476. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j), (k) (―The provisions of this chapter . . . shall not apply to .
. . [a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military . . . or
. . . [a]ny claim arising in a foreign country.‖).
477. See Edwin F. Hornbrook & Eugene J. Kirschbaum, The Feres Doctrine: Here
Today—Gone Tomorrow?, 33 A.F. L. REV. 1, 11 (1990) (―[A]bolishing Feres would splinter
military cohesion by creating a privileged class of claimants who could bring suit, and an
underprivileged class who would still be barred by the combat, foreign country, and
discretionary function exceptions.‖). See generally United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840,
844 (4th Cir. 1948) (hypothesizing the disparate treatment that similarly-situated soldiers
might nonetheless receive under the FTCA), rev’d, 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
478. S. DOC. NO. 80-179, at 2–3 (1948) (returning without approval the bill entitled ―An
Act for the Relief of the Estate of Lee Jones Cardy‖); see supra notes
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Eisenhower stated in a similar veto message, ―[u]niformity and equality of
treatment to all who are similarly situated must be the steadfast rule if the
Federal programs for veterans and their dependents are to be operated
successfully.‖479 This is why the Court thought it unlikely Congress would
sub silentio create a new, non-uniform remedy for those injured incidentto-service.480
c. The Military Compensation System & The Federal Tort Claims
Act
The Feres Court found it significant that Congress, having ―provide[d]
systems of simple, certain, and uniform compensation for injuries or death
of those in armed services,‖ failed to state how money received
administratively would be taken into account if a service member received
an FTCA judgment.481 The Court recognized four possible approaches
Congress could have adopted.482 It concluded that ―[t]he absence of any
such adjustment is persuasive that there was no [Congressional] awareness

125–29 (discussing vetoes of military private bills).
479. H.R. DOC. NO. 83-432, at 1–2 (1954) (returning without approval a bill for the relief
of Mrs. Josette L. St. Marie); see also H.R. DOC. NO. 83-426, at 1–2 (1954) (returning
without approval a bill for the relief of Theodor W. Carlson).
480. One of the lessons of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund is that
providing different, individualized awards to members of a group who have suffered similar
loss can cause frustration and ill-will:
[T]here are serious problems posed by a statutory approach mandating
individualized awards for each eligible claimant. The statutory mandate of tailored
awards fueled divisiveness among claimants and undercut the very cohesion and
united national response reflected in the Act. The fireman‘s widow would
complain: ―Why am I receiving less money than the stockbroker‘s widow? My
husband died a hero. Why are you demeaning the value of his life?‖ . . . The
statutory requirement that each individual claimant‘s award reflect unique financial
and family circumstances inevitably resulted in finger-pointing and a sense among
many claimants that the life of their loved one had been demeaned and undervalued
relative to others also receiving compensation from the Fund.
KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 82 (2008) (noting
that a better approach might have been to provide the same amount for all eligible
claimants); accord KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? THE UNPRECEDENTED
EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 71–73 (2005) (describing his encounters with
the 9/11 families at town meetings and their reactions of resentment, anger, and disbelief
when ―faced with the raw truth that each claimant would receive a different award
depending on the economic wherewithal of the victim‖ because ―[w]idows of firefighters
and military men . . . [were] receiv[ing] less from the fund than the stockbrokers‘ widows‖).
481. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950).
482. Id. The Court noted that a claimant might ―(a) enjoy both types of recovery, or (b)
elect which to pursue, thereby waiving the other, or (c) pursue both, crediting the larger
liability with the proceeds of the smaller, or (d) that the compensation and pension remedy
excludes the tort remedy.‖ Id.
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that the Act might be interpreted to permit recovery for injuries incident to
military service.‖483
Critics have faulted this conclusion, arguing that the Feres bar of claims
arising ―incident-to-service‖ is much broader than the workers‘
compensation laws‘ bar to suits by ―employees injured in accidents that
arise out of and in the course of employment,‖484 and that ―veterans
benefits are not as generous as the Court believed them to be.‖ 485 The first
argument presumes that the rights of civilians and service members to sue
their employers should be parallel even though their work connection
requirements for receiving benefits are categorically different: one
compensating injuries arising during ―course of employment‖ and the other
granting benefits for injuries arising during period of service.486 The
second argument presents one side of an interminable debate.487 Neither
argument addresses the Court‘s reasoning that if Congress had anticipated
483. Id. The Court then noted that the compensation system compared favorably to
―most workman‘s compensation statutes‖ and stated the administrative payments made to
Jefferson and Griggs. Id. at 145.
484. Brou, supra note 447, at 51; see, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 698
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that ―[r]ecovery is possible under workers‘
compensation statutes more often than under the [Veterans‘ Benefit Act],‖ and that
―[Veterans‘ Benefit Act] benefits can be terminated more easily than can workers‘
compensation‖ benefits); Turley, supra note 9, at 85 (arguing that unlike the Feres doctrine
which bars suit in non-work related areas, FECA‘s exclusive remedy is confined to workrelated injuries or illnesses and does not bar suits for injuries caused by government
negligence outside the employment context).
485. Brou, supra note 447, at 48.
486. See Brou, supra note 447, at 52–53 (touching upon the breadth of military medical
coverage). Unlike typical workers‘ compensation statutes, benefits are provided to veterans
and service members for any injury, disability, or death that arises at any time during their
period of service, with few exceptions. See supra Part II.B.1 (identifying the origin and
scope of the military‘s uniform compensation system). The liberal standard is reflected in
the title to the Congressional Act of September 27, 1944, which expanded the scope of the
benefits program: ―To repeal [the statute], which provides for the forfeiture of pay of
persons in the military and naval service . . . who are absent from duty on account of the
direct effects of venereal disease due to misconduct . . . .‖ Act of September 27, 1944, Pub.
L.
No.
78-430, 58 Stat. 752.
487. Resolving the ―generousness‖ argument would likely turn on the definition chosen.
Certainly, however, there are two sides to be considered. Compare Brou, supra note 447, at
48–51 (arguing that the scope of veterans‘ benefits is limited when compared to the
recoveries available in typical personal injury cases), with Hornbrook & Kirschbaum, supra
note 477, at 11–14 (endorsing the overall equity associated with veterans‘ benefits), and
Joanne M. Bernott, United States v. Johnson: The Dissent’s Flawed Attack on Feres v.
United States, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 109, 126 (1987) (arguing that criticisms of the
exclusive nature of the administrative remedies ―carelessly impugn[] the overall adequacy
of the military‘s statutory compensation scheme‖). Any weighing of the generousness of
veterans‘ benefits would need to consider the broad range of benefits, preferences and
perquisites available to veterans but not part of workers‘ compensation systems. See supra
Part I.B.1 (identifying the origins and scope of the military‘s uniform compensation
system). These include ―educational benefits, extensive health benefits, home-buying loan
benefits, and retirement benefits.‖ Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 690 n.10 (1987).
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that service members could recover under the FTCA it would have given
direction about how moneys received from the two remedies would be
adjusted.488
Justice Scalia argues that ―the [Veterans Benefits Act] is not, as Feres
assumed, identical to federal and state workers‘ compensation statutes‖
because they almost invariably contain ―exclusivity provisions‖ which the
veterans statutes do not.489 But the Court held in United States v. Demko490
that the Prison Industries Fund was the exclusive remedy for federal
prisoners injured while working for Federal Prison Industries, Inc., even
though that statute does not contain exclusivity language.491 The statute
was enacted in 1934 and its legislative history does not address the
exclusivity issue.492 The Court recognized that ―compensation laws are
practically always thought of as substitutes for, not supplements to,
common-law tort actions.‖493 It distinguished its Muniz decision because
unlike the prisoner plaintiffs there, plaintiff Demko was ―injured . . . in the
performance of an assigned prison task‖ and ―is protected by the prison
compensation law.‖494 Accordingly, that law was his exclusive remedy,
precluding his FTCA suit.495
Justice Scalia also argues that ―both before and after Feres we permitted
injured servicemen to bring FTCA suits, even though they had been
compensated under the [Veterans Benefit Act].‖496 He pointedly observes
that ―the [Veterans Benefit Act] will in fact be exclusive for serviceconnected injuries, but not for others,‖ and suggests that the tension cannot
be resolved from the texts of the statutes.497 This tension was recognized

488. Feres, 340 U.S. at 144. Jayson & Longstreth note:
Since the turn of the century, most tort remedies against employers for workrelated injuries have been eliminated, with an administrative compensation scheme
substituted in their place. . . . It would certainly be strange to conclude that
Congress intended that servicemen, virtually alone among American workers, be
given free rein to sue their employer.
JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 35, § 5A.05.
489. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 698 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
490. 385 U.S. 149 (1966).
491. Id. at 151–52. Federal Prison Industries, Inc. is the federal corporation
that provides training and rehabilitation programs for prisoners. 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (2006).
492. Denko, 385 U.S. at 152.
493. Id. at 151.
494. Id. at 149, 153.
495. Id. at 154.
496. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 697–98 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citing United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 111 (1954); Brooks v. United States,
337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949)).
497. Id. at 698.
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by the judges that dealt with the Feres litigation.498 It hardly shows that
Feres is wrong.
Nowhere in his dissent does Justice Scalia directly address or
acknowledge the Feres Court‘s core analysis on the compensation issue.
The absence from the FTCA of any ―statutory authority‖ one way or
another directing how tort judgments and money paid administratively are
to be reconciled suggests that Congress was not ―aware[] that the Act might
be interpreted to permit recovery for injuries incident to military
service.‖499
Some of the confusion surrounding the compensation issue is attributable
to the Court. Over time, the Court has been imprecise in describing Feres‘
analysis of the compensation issue. The Feres reasoning about the ―simple,
certain, and uniform‖ military compensation system500 is that, had
Congress contemplated that the FTCA would apply to incident-to-service
claims, ―it is difficult to see why it should have omitted any provision to
adjust these two types of remedy to each other.‖501 In Stencel Aero
Engineering Corp., this ―adjustment‖ point was lost; the Court stated only
that ―the Veterans‘ Benefits Act establishes, as a substitute for tort liability,
a statutory ‗no fault‘ compensation scheme which provides generous
pensions to injured servicemen, without regard to any negligence
attributable to the Government.‖502 In Shearer, the point was reduced to a
footnote: ―Although no longer controlling, other factors mentioned in
Feres are present here. . . . [T]he record shows that Private Shearer‘s
dependents are entitled to statutory veterans‘ benefits.‖503 In Johnson the
point was accurately presented again:
The Court in Feres found it difficult to believe that Congress would
have provided such a comprehensive system of benefits while at the
same time contemplating recovery for service-related injuries under the

498. See infra Part IV.B.3.c.
499. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950). Justice Scalia‘s Johnson dissent
has received its own criticism:
The dissent‘s case against Feres fails because it does not directly address the plain
meaning of Sections 1346(b) and 2674; does not address Justice Jackson‘s
syllogistic inquiry into the Congressional intent behind the FTCA; relies nearly
exclusively on post-Feres case law to undermine a statutory interpretation premised
on the statute‘s text and legislative history; turns on an ill-considered proclamation
about the legal mores of 1946; and too casually repudiates almost forty years of
Congressional tolerance and expansion of the Feres doctrine.
Bernott, supra note 487, at 135.
500. Feres, 340 U.S. at 144.
501. Id.
502. Stencel Aero Eng‘g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671 (1977).
503. United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58 n.4 (1985) (citing Feres, 340 U.S. at 144–
45).
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FTCA. Particularly persuasive was the fact that Congress ―omitted any
provision to adjust these two types of remedy to each other.‖504

2.

Other Challenges to the Feres Conclusion
a.

Language in Earlier Tort Claims Bills

When it laid out the ―considerations persuasive of liability,‖505 the Feres
Court noted that ―eighteen tort claims bills were introduced in Congress
between 1925 and 1935 and all but two expressly denied recovery to
members of the armed forces; but the bill enacted as the present Tort
Claims Act from its introduction made no exception.‖506 Many critics have
argued that this piece of information undermines Feres‘ holding: ―The
omission of such a bar, when one was considered and rejected in sixteen
previous tort bills, clearly indicates that Congress did not intend to limit
service members‘ ability to sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act.‖507
There are three problems with this argument. First, it ignores the
substantial time gap between when the cited bills were considered—the last
was in 1935—and passage of the FTCA more than a decade later.508 The
cited bills are not contemporaneous with the FTCA‘s enactment and,
therefore, are suspect as a reflection of Congressional intent in 1946.509

504. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 690 (1987) (quoting Feres, 340 U.S. at
144).
505. Feres, 340 U.S. at 138.
506. Id. at 139 (citing Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51 (1949)). The Court‘s
comment that ―the bill enacted . . . made no exception‖ refers to S. 2177, 79th Cong. tit. IV
(1946).
507. Brou, supra note 447, at 37; see, e.g., Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 870 n.
1(9th Cir. 2001) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (citing Feres, 340 U.S. at 138–39, and asserting
―that all but two of the eighteen drafts of the FTCA considered by Congress barred suits by
members of the military‖); Turley, supra note 9, at 16 n.105 (stating that ―sixteen of the
eighteen drafts of the FTCA contained a prohibition on suits by service members, a position
rejected in the final legislation.‖).
508. Brou states that ―[b]etween 1942 and the passage of the [FTCA] in 1946, Congress
considered eighteen tort claims bills.‖ Brou, supra note 447, at 37. But the eighteen bills
cited in her supporting footnote are the same ones cited in Brooks and are dated from 1925
to 1935. Compare id. at 37 n.261, with Brooks, 337 U.S. at 51 n.2.
509. See CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, USING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN AMERICAN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 27, 67 (2002) (acknowledging the usefulness of legislative history in
clarifying ambiguous statutory issues, but qualifying this acknowledgment by stating that
only contemporaneous legislative history should be used in the aid of statutory interpretation
because pre-enactment legislative history is suspect); see also id. at
66–67, (citing Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 497 n.3 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)) (supporting a general proposition that pre-enactment legislative
history is suspect). In Cowart, Justice Blackmun questioned the use of legislative history
from predecessor bills considered three years prior to the enactment of the Longshore and
Harbor Workers‘ Compensation Act Amendments of 1984. 505 U.S. at 497 n.3 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
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Second, the bills were very different from the FTCA as it was finally
enacted. Six of them provided only administrative remedies for personal
injury or wrongful death claims, with no recourse to the courts.510 Eight
called for administrative proceedings before the General Accounting Office
or an Employees Compensation Commission, coupled with a right to
review in the Court of Claims.511 Fourteen of them had different
procedures for property claims than for claims involving personal injury or
death.512 Fourteen placed caps on the amount of damages that might be
recovered.513
Only three of the eighteen bills granted subject matter jurisdiction to
United States district courts, and they bear very little resemblance to the
FTCA as it was enacted.514 They are much shorter than the FTCA, having
lengths of 100 lines,515 fifty lines,516 and fifty-one lines,517 compared to the
FTCA‘s 307 lines.518 None of the three contained a detailed jurisdictional
grant comparable to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).519 None contained any of the
exceptions included in § 2680 of the FTCA,520 although two included
provisions that would bar claims by service members.521 Because the

510. See H.R. 15428, 71st Cong. § 1(a) (1930); S. 4377, 71st Cong. §§ 201–209 (1930);
H.R. 9285, 70th Cong. §§ 201–209 (1928); H.R. 6716, 69th Cong. §§ 201–213 (1926); S.
1912, 69th Cong. §§ 2, 3 (1926); H.R. 12178, 68th Cong. § 2 (1925).
511. See S. 1043, 74th Cong. § 304 (1935); H.R. 129, 73d Cong. §§ 11–12, 14–15
(1933); S. 1833, 73d Cong. § 304 (1933) (providing that any insurance available to claimant
be deducted from the damages to be paid by government); S. 4567, 72d Cong. § 304 (1932)
(same); S. 211, 72d Cong. § 303 (1931); H.R. 5065, 72d Cong. § 303 (1931); H.R. 17168,
71st Cong. §§ 303, 307 (1931) (―[T]he findings of the Comptroller General shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.‖); H.R. 16429, 71st Cong. §§ 33, 37 (1931)
(same).
512. See S. 1043 (providing different procedures and limitations for property damage
claims than those for personal injury claims)); S. 1833, 73d Cong. (1933) (same); S. 4567
(same); S. 211, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1931) (same); H.R. 5065, 72d Cong. (1931) (same);
H.R. 17168 (1931) (same); H.R. 16429 (same); H.R. 15428 (conferring authority upon the
Court of Claims to review on certiorari any settlements made under the provisions of the
title,
but
limited
the
record
on
review
to
―a transcript of all the papers filed . . . prior to [the] settlement, together with . . . the
decision of the Comptroller General‖); S. 4377 (same) ; H.R. 9285 (same); H.R. 6716
(same); S. 1912 (providing no provision for personal injury or death); H.R. 12179, 68th
Cong. (1925) (providing no provision for property damage); H.R. 12178 (providing no
provision for property damage).
513. See supra notes 438–40 and accompanying text (discussing the use of damage caps
in pre-FTCA bills).
514. See H.R. 8561, 73d Cong. § 2 (1934) (requiring pre-suit certificate of probable
cause from the district judge); H.R. 8914, 69th Cong. (1926); H.R. 12179.
515. H.R. 8561.
516. H.R. 8914.
517. H.R. 12179.
518. S. 2177, 79th Cong. (1946) 62–71.
519. H.R. 8561; H.R. 8914; H.R. 12179.
520. See id.
521. H.R. 8914 § 6; H.R. 12179 § 6.
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eighteen cited bills are so different from the FTCA, the absence of some of
their provisions from its final version does not demonstrate Congressional
intent.522
The third reason to reject the inference of Congressional intent from the
absence of an explicit FTCA exception for service members is that such an
exception was unnecessary in the first place. Judge Augustus Hand
explained three key points in the Second Circuit‘s Feres opinion: (1)
service members could not recover for injuries incurred incident-to-service
under the Military Personnel Claims Act;523 (2) law established by Dobson
and Bradey before enactment of the FTCA barred suit for such injuries;524
and (3) the World War Veterans‘ Act of 1924 had been amended to state
that when it provided compensation, ―‗no other pension laws or laws
providing for gratuities or payments in the event of death in the service‘
shall be applicable to disabilities or deaths made compensable under the
Act.‖525 Accordingly, ―the explanation for the omission of the thirteenth
exception to the Tort Claims Act is that it was considered unnecessary.‖526
Chief Judge Parker of the Fourth Circuit was apparently persuaded by
Judge Hand‘s analysis. In his dissent from the Fourth Circuit‘s Brooks
decision, Judge Parker noted that the proposed exception in H.R. 181
would have barred, ―‗[a]ny claim for which compensation is provided by
the Federal Employees‘ Compensation Act, as amended, or by the World
War
Veterans‘
Act
of
1924,
as
amended.‘‖527
He argued that ―[w]hat seems a conclusive reason for not reading into the
act the exception suggested, however, is that this exception was originally
contained in the tort claims act which was introduced into Congress . . . and
was omitted, with apparent deliberation, when that bill was
incorporated . . . [into] the Legislative Reorganization Act.‖528 A year later,
sitting on the Fourth Circuit‘s unanimous Jefferson panel, Judge Parker
declined to make that argument.529 Rather, the Fourth Circuit stated that it
522. See U.S. Brooks Br., supra note 60, at 35–36 (proposing alternative interpretations
of the Congressional intent underlying the passage of the FTCA); MAMMEN, supra note 509,
at 67 (qualifying the usefulness of pre-enactment legislative history when interpreting
ambiguous statutory issues).
523. Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1949) (citing 31
U.S.C. § 223b (1946)).
524. Id. (citing Bradey v. United States, 151 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1945); Dobson v. United
States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928)).
525. Id. at 537–38 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 422 (1946)).
526. Id. at 538.
527. United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 849 (4th Cir. 1948) (Parker, C.J., dissenting)
(citing H.R. 181, 79th Cong. § 402(8) (1946)), rev’d, 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
528. Id.
529. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres
v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (―[T]oo much weight should not be given to the
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was ―in accord with the conclusions reached by the Second Circuit.‖530 Its
opinion concluded that Congress had not intended for the FTCA to allow
every injury to a service member to become a potential negligence action
because that would require the courts to review military decisions and
would undermine military discipline.531 The court reasoned that ―this
consideration [was] too weighty to be swept aside by‖ the argument that
Congress must have intended to allow such suits when it had not included a
proposed exception for military claims in the final version of the FTCA.532
Judge Chesnut followed a similar path in the Jefferson district court
litigation, acknowledging the potential strength of the missing exception
argument in his first opinion,533 but holding against it in the second.534
b.

Feres & the Deterrence Role of Tort Law

Feres is attacked on the ground that its bar to suit by service members
for government negligence has removed the deterrence role that tort law
normally serves. Professor Turley argues largely from the perspective of
financial deterrence535 while Major Brou argues for the deterrence of
disclosure.536
i.

Financial Deterrence

Professor Turley argues that the Feres bar immunizes the military from
the financial costs of our tort system that normally encourage safe
practices. He states:
Feres constitutes a major reduction in potential costs for military
businesses and activities. For most businesses, liability costs (including
insurance, risk abatement, and actual liability awards) represent a
significant budget component. . . . Moreover, potential liability costs are
a critical factor in businesses determining whether to enter a particular
market or enterprise. For the military, such costs are present in a greatly
reduced form.537
language contained in discarded measures . . . .‖).
530. Id. at 519.
531. Id. at 520.
532. Id.
533. Jefferson, 74 F. Supp. 209, 211 (D. Md. 1947).
534. Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. 706, 712 (D. Md. 1948), aff’d, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949),
aff’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
535. See Turley, supra note 9, at 46–47 (relying upon the paradigm of the rational, selfinterested, value-maximizing actor).
536. See Brou, supra note 447, at 33 (noting the increased judicial and public attention
that FTCA claims impose on government organizations).
537. Turley, supra note 9, at 49–50. Professor Turley develops his Feres-Deterrenceargument at length. Id. at 46–67. Accordingly, this summary of his argument is necessarily
truncated.
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....
With commonly tight budgetary conditions in the military,
asymmetrical increases in the cost of individual units or programs will
also be generally tracked. Even if such costs are borne in part by the
Justice Department as the designated defense counsel for such claims,
these costs will become part of an appropriation request and therefore
subject to an oversight review in Congress. . . . This could introduce
personal costs for physicians in the form of increased insurance rates.538

....
By introducing a liability system, the military will be forced to
internalize more of the true costs of [its negligence].539

The argument that Feres undermines the financial deterrence role of tort
law fails for two reasons. First, as a general matter there is reason to
believe that governments are not responsive to financial deterrence in the
same way as private entities. Second, federal agencies such as the
Department of Defense are not responsive to financial deterrence because
they have virtually no stake in the financial outcome of tort claims brought
against the United States for their negligent acts.
Professor Turley reasons that ―there is little question that increasing
levels of liability will influence the conduct of a rational actor.‖540 There
is, however, substantial question about how governments will respond to
increased tort liability because governments and their agencies are not
motivated by the single interest of maximizing monetary value.541 Because
governments and agencies respond to political interests rather than
financial ones, it is unlikely that requiring them to pay tort judgments will
cause them to alter their practices or begin new loss prevention
initiatives.542 This is particularly so if agencies perceive that compensation
payments will not affect their budgets, either because payments are made
from a general fund or because they expect that money paid from budgets
538. Id. at 66.
539. Id. at 67.
540. Id. at 47.
541. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 355–56 (2000) (concluding that
one cannot simply assume ―that government will behave like a private, profit-maximizing
firm‖).
542. See Turley, supra note 9, at 48 (―[P]ast cases indicate high rates of malpractice and
injuries have occurred within this [military] system without meaningful risk-avoidance . . .
.‖); Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 915, 965 (2005) (―Government officials do not derive any intrinsic value from public
funds . . . and therefore do not necessarily attach any disutility to losing it through
compensation payments.‖); Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages
Liability: Torts, Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 824–26
(2007) (summarizing the gradual erosion of the assumption that government tort liability
works in the same manner as the common law liability of private tortfeasors).
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will be restored in future appropriations.543 Agencies will also weigh the
political cost of choosing loss prevention programs and enhanced safety
over core agency functions and more politically-valued programs.544
Because agencies engage in such political balancing, ―tort liability cannot
be expected to promote efficient government investment in loss
prevention.‖545 When tort damages are paid out as a consequence of such
choices, the agency can rationalize the payment as ―a cost of public
policy.‖546
Accordingly, agencies are not responsive to financial
deterrence.
Financial deterrence is even less effective with federal agencies such as
the Department of Defense. Federal agencies in general are subject to the
political issues discussed in the preceding paragraph. Because military
officers will not expect to be in the same position three years hence, their
political choices regarding the programs they direct may be even more
skewed to favor core agency functions.547
Federal agencies have very little stake in the financial outcome of tort
litigation that arises from their negligence.548 Agencies do not pay FTCA
settlements in excess of $2,500 or FTCA judgments.549 Those settlements
and judgments are paid from the Judgment Fund rather than agency

543. Accord Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious Case
of the Missing Tort Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 758 (2004) (examining similar incentive
structures within the context of police departments); see Levinson, supra note 542, at 966
(acknowledging that legislators who approve of an agency‘s activities may simply replace
any losses imposed by liability in the following appropriations cycle).
544. See Rosenthal, supra note 542, at 826 (―When the political cost of diverting public
resources to loss prevention is sufficiently high, government will not make the investment
even when it is economically justified.‖).
545. Id. For example, a social welfare agency must choose between providing more
benefits directly to clients and maintaining its physical facilities and staff credentials.
546. See Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REV.
1529, 1539 (1992).
547. See generally 10 U.S.C. § 664 (2008) (stipulating the length of duty assignments);
DEP‘T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NUMBER 1300.19, DOD JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM 3 (2010) (evidencing DOD policy that tour lengths not exceed three years per
tour).
548. See Hornbrook & Kirschbaum, supra note 477, at 15 (―[T]he FTCA message to
correct negligent behavior is somewhat muted since the FTCA holds the Government, not
the individual, liable‖). But see id. (acknowledging that federal agencies do bear the cost of
providing litigation support, witnesses, and in-house counsel to assist the Department of
Justice attorneys that represent the government in court).
549. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (2006); 3 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE GEN.
COUNSEL, GAO-08-078SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 14–30 to –44 (3d
ed. 2008) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES, 3d. ed.], available at
http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/d08978sp.pdf.
The
rare
exceptions
include
nonappropriated fund instrumentalities, id. at 15–266, and the U.S. Postal Service, 3 U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, GAO/OGC-94-33, PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 14–34 to –37 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES, 2d. ed.],
available at http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/og94033.pdf.
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appropriations.550 Because the Judgment Fund is a permanent, indefinite
appropriation,551 any FTCA judgment or settlement is paid automatically
and without any Congressional oversight review.552 Because the FTCA
grants immunity to federal employees for any tort cognizable under the
Act,553 those employees do not suffer financial consequences for their
negligence nor do they need liability insurance.554 For all these reasons, if
Feres did not exist, the Department of Defense would be no more
responsive to financial deterrence than it is with Feres.
ii.

Deterrence of Disclosure

Major Brou argues that the Feres Court, in focusing on the compensation
aspect of the benefits provided to injured service members, ignored the
preventative function provided by tort law. In arguing that FTCA claims
have the potential to hone judicial and public attention on the shortcomings
of governmental organizations, Major Brou maintains that the Feres
doctrine undermines the government‘s incentive to improve efficiency and
safety by allowing it to avoid liability for injuries inflicted upon service
members by government negligence.555
This argument ignores the non-tort factors that already bring about
disclosure, overestimates the likely effect of disclosures that might arise
from tort litigation, and disregards the current exposure of military agencies
to tort litigation arising from care provided to civilians. There are more
effective ways to bring about broad public disclosure than tort litigation,
including a vigorous political system and a free press.556 Most tort cases
(as opposed to their underlying events) do not lead to widespread media

550. See 31 U.S.C. §1304 (2006); PRINCIPLES, 3d. ed., supra note 549, at 14–19 to
–49.
551. See H.R. REP NO. 84-2638, at 72 (1957) (noting that H.R. 12138, 84th Cong.
§ 1302 ―establish[es] a permanent indefinite appropriation for the payment of judgments‖).
552. PRINCIPLES, 2d. ed., supra note 549, at 14-5 to -15; JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra
note 35, § 3.03.
553. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (2006).
554. Government health care professionals stand in a different posture because, although
they are immune from paying damages, adverse judgments arising from their care are
reported
to
the
National
Practitioner
Data
Bank.
See
42
U.S.C.
§§ 11131–37 (2006). See generally Hornbrook & Kirschbaum supra note 477, at 15 n.104.
555. Brou, supra note 449, at 33; see also Turley, supra note 9, at 47–49 (discussing
non-liability mechanisms that can influence agency risk prevention).
556. See Rosenthal, supra note 542, at 828–29 (rejecting the suggestion that tort
litigation will ―unearth[] governmental misconduct‖); Turley, supra note 9, at 47 (noting
good faith military response to political pressure about medical malpractice). But see
Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of
Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 859–62 (2001) (exploring the
informational and fault-fixing features of municipal liability suits).
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coverage.557 To the extent that tort litigation has a deterrence of disclosure,
the military medical system is already fruitful ground for its work because
a majority of its patients are not service members to whom Feres applies.558
Therefore, doing away with Feres would bring about only an incremental
increase in the deterrence of disclosure.
3.

Characterizations of Feres
a.

Feres as “Judicially Created”

In Feres, the Court explained: ―We do not think that Congress, in
drafting this Act, created a new cause of action dependent on local law for
service-connected injuries or death due to negligence.‖559 Thus, on its face,
Feres is the Supreme Court‘s interpretation of Congressional intent, rather
than a judicial promulgation of a new exception to the FTCA. Over the last
three decades, this point has been clouded by a number of circuit court
opinions that casually characterize the Feres doctrine as a ―judicially
created exception‖ to the FTCA.560
The opinions support this
characterization by reference to the statute,561 to Feres itself,562 or to
nothing at all.563
The notion that Feres is a ―judicially created FTCA exception‖ was
mentioned in only one judicial opinion in the first twenty-three years after
the decision.564 From 1973 to 1977, just three opinions used the ―judicially
557. See Rosenthal, supra note 542, at 828–29.
558. See U.S. DEP‘T OF DEF., EVALUATION OF THE TRICARE PROGRAM: FISCAL YEAR
2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS 17 (2010) (reporting that Active Duty military personnel
constituted fourteen percent of beneficiaries eligible for DoD health care benefits at the end
of fiscal year 2009, and Guard and Reserve military personnel constituted four percent; the
remaining eighty-two percent are active duty family members, guard and reserve family
members, and retirees and family members).
559. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
560. See, e.g., McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1341 (11th Cir.
2007); Brown v. United States, 462 F.3d 609, 611 (6th Cir. 2006) (―[The FTCA is] subject
to a judicially-created exception carved out in Feres v. United States . . . .‖); Pringle v.
United States, 208 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Miller v. United States,
42 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1995); Romero ex rel. Romero v. United States, 954 F.2d 223,
224 (4th Cir. 1992); Chatman v. Hernandez, 805 F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam);
Brown v. United States, 739 F.2d 362, 364–65 (8th Cir. 1984); see also Hata v. United
States, 23 F.3d 230, 234 (9th Cir. 1994) (describing the Feres doctrine as a ―judicially
created ‗incident to service‘ exception to the [FTCA]‖).
561. Hata, 23 F.3d at 234 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994)).
562. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1341; Brown, 462 F.3d at 611; Pringle, 208 F.3d at 1223;
Romero, 954 F.2d at 224; Chatman, 805 F.2d at 457; cf. Brown, 739 F.2d at 365 (citing
United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954); Feres, 340 U.S. 135; Brooks v. United States,
337 U.S. 49 (1949)).
563. Miller, 42 F.3d at 300.
564. Mattos v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 38, 38 (E.D. Cal. 1967) (addressing the
contention that ―no recovery may be had as against the United States because of judiciallycreated exception to the [FTCA] . . . .‖ (emphasis added)).
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created‖ characterization, but none provided authority or explanation for
the term.565 In a similar fashion, and with a similar lack of authority or
explanation, Justice Marshall used the phrase in his 1977 Stencel dissent,
stating, ―I cannot agree that that narrow, judicially created exception to the
waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the Act should be extended to
any category of litigation other than suits against the Government by
active-duty servicemen based on injuries incurred while on duty.‖566
Legal scholarship was similarly silent. Only one academic article
published in the 1950s suggested that Feres judicially created a new
exception to the FTCA.567 In the 1960s, only one student article made such
a characterization.568 In the 1980s, it appeared in several student works569
and a handful of works by scholars.570 As in the judicial opinions, the
characterization was either baldly stated or supported only by a reference to
the FTCA or the Feres opinion.571
By the 1990s, the notion that the Feres decision had ―judicially created‖
a new exception to the FTCA had become a shibboleth, widely repeated,

565. Hass ex rel. United States v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138, 1143 (4th Cir. 1975)
(citing only Feres); Bankston v. United States, 480 F.2d 495, 496 (5th Cir. 1973) (same);
Frazier v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 208, 208–09 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (same).
566. Stencel Aero Eng‘g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 674 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
567. See Robert A. Hitch, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Military Personnel, 8
RUTGERS L. REV. 316, 316 (1954) (―In Feres . . . [t]he Court in effect added an exception to
the act which discriminated against certain servicemen.‖).
568. Recent Development, Negligently Conducted Pre-Induction Physical Examination
Not Actionable Under Federal Tort Claims Act when Injury Occurs During Service, 62
COLUM. L. REV. 381, 381–82 (1962) (characterizing the Feres doctrine as an exception
―created by judicial decision‖).
569. See, e.g., John Astley, Note, United States v. Johnson: Feres Doctrine Gets New
Life and Continues to Grow, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 185, 185 (1988) (―The source of the
injustice is the Feres doctrine, the only judicially-created exception to the [FTCA].‖ (citing
Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401–22, 60 Stat. 842 (1946); Feres v.
United States 340 U.S. 135 (1950))); Brian P. Cain, Note, Military Medical Malpractice and
the Feres Doctrine, 20 GA. L. REV. 497, 498 (1986); J. Thomas Morina, Note, Denial of
Atomic Veterans’ Tort Claims: The Enduring Fallout from Feres v. United States, 24 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 259, 260 (1983); Lora Tredway, Comment, When a Veteran “Wants”
Uncle Sam: Theories of Recovery for Servicemembers Exposed to Hazardous Substances,
31 AM. U. L. REV. 1095, 1112 (1982).
570. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 1007, 1086 n.337 (1989) (explaining that the Supreme Court used a broad
application of a ―judicially created exception to FTCA‖); Courtney W. Howland, The
Hands-Off Policy and Intramilitary Torts, 71 IOWA L. REV. 93, 102 (1985); Harold Hongju
Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the IranContra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1336 n.377 (1988); Paul Wolfson, Preemption and
Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69, 105 n.198 (1988) (describing
the ―judicially created Feres doctrine‖ as peculiar); see also Jeffrey R. Simmons, Military
Medical Malpractice, 23 ARIZ. B.J. 22, 24 (1988) (explaining that the Court ―judicially
created an exception in . . . Feres‖).
571. See supra notes 569–70.
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generally accepted, and largely unexamined.572 The falsity of that notion is
suggested by the fact that it was barely murmured in the two decades
immediately following the decision. The falsity is demonstrated by an
examination of how the Feres Court came to its decision.573
b.

Feres as “Usurpation”

Some of the most distinguished critics of the Feres opinion go further
than repeating the vaguely judgmental, ―judicially created‖ allegation.
They accuse the Court of intentionally usurping the role of Congress.
Professor Turley argues:
[T]he actions of the Court in creating the Feres doctrine go far beyond
other areas in usurping legislative prerogatives. The Court essentially
created a civil liability system to its own liking, based on its own
uninformed assumptions. The Court‘s unilateral action not only conflicts
with the language of the FTCA but engages in a level of judicial
legislation that may be unprecedented in its scope and impact. At a
minimum, Feres represented a total departure from principles of judicial
restraint and deference to the political branches.574

This is a very strong accusation.
The Feres opinion explicitly states that the Court‘s goal was to figure
out, as best it could, what Congress had intended when it passed the
FTCA.575 The task was difficult because nothing in the FTCA‘s legislative
572. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 441, 444 (1999) (―[T]he judiciary has created an additional, major
exception . . . known as the Feres doctrine.‖); Hornbrook & Kirschbaum, supra note 477, at
18 (1990); see also Norman W. Black, Recent Developments in Admiralty Law in the United
States Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit, and the Eleventh Circuit, 19 HOUS. J. INT‘L L. 327,
353 (1997) (citing Miller v. United States, 42 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1995)); Koh, supra
note 570, at 1336 n.377 (citing United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 694 (1987) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)); Peggy L. Miller, An Ounce of Immunity Prevents a Pound of Lawsuits:
Medical Malpractice and Military Mothers, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 327, 332 (1993)
(citing Feres, 340 U.S. 135); Sisk, supra note 444, at 287; Wolfson, supra note 570, at 105
n.198 (citing Johnson, 481 U.S. at 694–97 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Feres, 340 U.S. at 143–
44).
573. See discussion supra Part IV.
574. Turley, supra note 9, at 68 (citing City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303
(1976) (per curiam); Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir. 2001) (Ferguson, J.,
dissenting)) (emphasis added). Judge Ferguson stated:
When considering the Feres doctrine, however, we are not dealing with a
legislative action, but rather with a judicial re-writing of an unambiguous and
constitutional statute. . . . Feres presented neither ambiguity nor constitutional
violation nor legislative silence. . . . [T]he Court simply did not agree with
Congress and searched in puzzling ways to declare that military personnel are not
equal to civilians.
Costo, 248 F.3d at 871, 873.
575. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 138 (―The only issue of law raised is whether the Tort
Claims Act extends its remedy to one sustaining ‗incident to the service‘ what under other
circumstances would be an actionable wrong.‖); id. (―Under these circumstances [the
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history addressed the question whether the Act encompassed claims arising
from military service.576 The usurpation theory requires disbelief of the
Court‘s statements that it was engaged in good faith legislative
interpretation. But there is no basis for concluding that the Court was
disingenuous.
The Feres decision does not conflict with the language of the FTCA.
The argument that it does conflict is based on the assertion that the
combatant activity exception of § 2680(j) is the only provision that limits
service members‘ rights under the FTCA.577 While the exceptions set out
in § 2680 are important limitations on the FTCA‘s waiver of sovereign
immunity, the jurisdictional limits of § 1346(b) are an equally important
part of the law and must also be met.578 Accordingly, the combatant
activity exception of § 2680(j) is not the only FTCA provision that might
bar claims of service members.579
The usurpation theory is baseless. There is simply no evidence that nine
justices chose to ―create[] a civil liability system to [their] own liking‖580

absence of any legislative history], no conclusion can be above challenge, but if we
misinterpret the Act, at least Congress possesses a ready remedy.‖); id. at 146 (―We do not
think that Congress, in drafting this Act, created a new cause of action dependent on local
law for service-connected injuries or death due to negligence.‖).
576. Id. at 138 (―No committee reports or floor debates disclose what effect the statute
was designed to have on the problem before us, or that it even was in mind.‖).
577. See, e.g., Turley, supra note 9, at 8 (asserting that Congress only expressly
exempted FTCA claims that arose out of ―combatant activities of the military . . . [in a] time
of war,‖ noting that the ―choice of wording by Congress is telling‖); see also Costo, 248
F.3d at 871–73 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). Judge Ferguson argued:
Feres took [the combatant activity exception, § 2680(j),] a fairly small, clearly
defined, legislatively-created classification and broadened it considerably. . . . We
can speculate forever upon reasons why Feres refused to apply a law written by
Congress. It is clear that Feres recognized that the direct and unambiguous
command of Congress created liability for claims caused by members of the
military or naval forces of the United States, Feres, 340 U.S. at 138; 28 U.S.C. §
2671, and that the direct and unambiguous command of Congress exempted only
claims arising out of combatant activities during time of war, Feres, 340 U.S. at
138; 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j).
Costo, 248 F.3d at 872–73 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). This is mistaken on both accounts.
The Court did not derive Feres from the combatant activity exception. The Feres opinion
mentions the exception only once, and only in the context of discussing several rejected
―considerations persuasive of liability.‖ 340 U.S. at 138. Nor did the Court recognize that
the exception created a ―direct and unambiguous command.‖ To the contrary, the Court
considered this argument and rejected it. See id. (identifying the argument that ―from [the
combatant activity exception] it is said we should infer allowance of claims arising from
non-combat activities in peace‖).
578. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477 (1994) (explaining that Section 1346(b)
grants jurisdiction for certain claims against the United States, and noting that each element
of the jurisdictional grant must be met; supra notes 459–63 and accompanying text).
579. See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 477 (rejecting an FTCA claim on the grounds that it failed
to present a cognizable claim to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement).
580. See Turley, supra note 9, at 68.
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and disregarded a ―direct and unambiguous command‖581 of Congress. The
historical backdrop to Feres fully supports the Court‘s conclusion that
Congress did not contemplate that the FTCA would allow incident-toservice suits by service members. This background includes the long
legislative build-up to the enactment of the FTCA, the detailed,
compensation system Congress created for service members, coupled with
the lack of Congressional direction about how that compensation would be
reconciled with FTCA judgments, the significant pre-FTCA body of law
barring suits related to military service, and the absence of private laws
enacted for service members.
The strongest reason to reject the usurpation theory is the evident good
faith of the justices who dealt with the incident-to-service issue. Feres was
decided without dissent.582 Of those nine justices, five had voted in favor
of the Brooks holding that service members could sue under the FTCA for
injuries not incident-to-service.583 The fact that a majority of the justices
voted against the government in Brooks and for the government in Feres is
strong confirmation that they were forthright in their approach to
ascertaining what Congress had intended, as opposed to pushing some promilitary agenda.
Chief Judge Parker of the Fourth Circuit followed a similar path. Judge
Parker had dissented from the Fourth Circuit opinion in Brooks, which held
that the FTCA did not allow any suits by service members.584 His dissent
foreshadowed the Supreme Court‘s Brooks opinion, which reversed the
Fourth Circuit and held that suits could be brought for injuries to service
members that were not incident to military service.585 Judge Parker was
also on the unanimous Fourth Circuit panel in Jefferson that held the FTCA
did not authorize claims for injuries that arose incident-to-service because
―it [was] not reasonable to suppose, in the absence of an express
declaration on the point, that Congress intended‖ to allow such claims.586
U.S. District Judge William Chesnut showed similar care and intellectual
honesty. When first confronted with the incident-to-service issue in
581. Costo, 248 F.3d at 873 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
582. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 135.
583. See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53–54 (1949). Justices Frankfurter and
Douglas dissented. Id. Justice Clark joined the Court on August 19, 1949. Justice Minton
joined on October 12, 1949.
584. United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 846 (4th Cir. 1948) (Parker, J., dissenting),
rev’d 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
585. The Supreme Court stated in its Brooks opinion, ―We agree with Judge Parker.‖
Brooks, 337 U.S. at 51. It then adopted much of his analysis. Compare Brooks, 337 U.S. at
51–54, with Brooks, 169 F.2d at 846–50.
586. See Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom.
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
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Jefferson, he denied the government‘s motion to dismiss without
prejudice.587 Following a trial on the merits, he re-examined the motion
and granted it, concluding that such claims ―were not within the
contemplation of Congress in enacting this particular legislation.‖588
The usurpation theory is refuted by the language of Justice Jackson‘s
opinion, the lack of evidence that the Court was disingenuous in stating its
legislative interpretation goal, and the justices‘ demonstrated willingness to
reject the government‘s strong arguments and find liability in Brooks. It is
also contradicted by the richness of thought and due care of the judges who
dealt with the incident-to-service issue in the courts below. A careful
reading of the decisions in Brooks, Jefferson, Griggs, and Feres, and the
Supreme Court briefs in those cases, negates any suggestion that the Court
sought to ignore Congress and impose its own will.
c.

Feres as “Unfair”

The Feres opinion has repeatedly been characterized as unfair. Justice
Scalia condemned ―our clearly wrong decision in Feres and . . . the
unfairness and irrationality that decision has bred.‖589 It is said that ―[t]he
injustice of the doctrine is patently obvious and very well known,‖590 and
that ―[f]ailure to repeal the Feres Doctrine has allowed service members
unfairly to be treated differently from other persons, and denied
compensation for injuries suffered.‖591
The perception of unfairness seems to have two sources. The first is
public perception itself. The ―judicially created‖ shibboleth is not much
questioned because it is so often repeated.592 The same may be true for the
―unfairness‖ label.593 The second source begins from the premise that
service members should be able to sue the government in the same way that
others
can,
and
concludes
it
is
unfair
that

587. See Jefferson, 74 F. Supp. 209, 216 (D. Md. 1947).
588. See Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. 706, 713 (D. Md. 1948), aff’d, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir.
1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
589. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 703 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
590. Barry, supra note 8, at 121; accord Johnson, 481 U.S. at 701 n.* (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (listing cases and law review articles critical of Feres); see also Dana Michael
Hollywood, Creating a True Army of One: Four Proposals to Combat Sexual Harassment
in Today’s Army, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 151, 192 (2007) (describing the argument that
Feres has engendered ―unfairness and irrationality‖ as ―most compelling‖); Miller, supra
note 572, at 336 (explaining the unfairness imposed by a service member‘s inability to
choose a place of residence working in tandem with the Feres doctrine to prevent the choice
of state tort law).
591. A.B.A. & B. ASS‘N OF D.C., supra note 7, at 19.
592. See supra Part IV.B.3.a.
593. See, e.g., Barry, supra note 8, at 121 (stating, without citation, that ―[t]he injustice
of the doctrine is patently obvious and very well known‖).
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they cannot.594
That premise ignores the distinctive relationship
service members have with the government.595 It also glosses over
the workers‘ compensation-like trade of accepting assured, administrative,
no-fault compensation in exchange for forgoing the opportunity to bring
suit in tort and recover more damages.596 The real consequence of Feres is
that, for purposes of suing their employer in tort, the government‘s military
employees are treated in roughly the same fashion as employees of other
employers.597 This is hardly unfair.598
CONCLUSION
To discuss the consequences of the Feres decision it may be helpful to
return to first principles. A sovereign state can be sued only to the extent
that it has consented to be sued and only its legislative branch can give
such consent.599 Absent an applicable waiver of sovereign immunity, the
United States cannot be sued for damages.600 Any such waiver ―must be
unequivocally expressed in statutory text . . . and will not be implied.‖601
Congress created such a waiver when it passed the Federal Tort Claims
Act.
The issue in Feres was direct and specific: ―[W]hether the Tort Claims
Act extends its remedy to one sustaining ‗incident to the service‘ what
under other circumstances would be an actionable wrong.‖602 This is an all
or nothing proposition—either Congress provided the necessary waiver for
incident-to-service suits or it did not. The Court held that Congress had not

594. See, e.g., supra notes 590–91.
595. See supra Part IV.B.1.b.
596. See Michael L. Richmond, Protecting the Power Brokers: Of Feres, Immunity, and
Privilege, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 623, 644–47 (1988) (exploring the notion that the
compensation rationale of Feres is analogous to a workers‘ compensation scheme in
justifying the disallowance of FTCA claims).
597. See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 35, § 5A.05; supra Part IV.B.1.c.
598. See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 37, § 5A.05 (―[T]here appears to be little
validity to the view that it is a harsh and inequitable doctrine that Congress simply could not
have intended to impose on servicemen.‖); Joan M. Bernott, Fairness and Feres: A Critique
of the Presumption of Injustice, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 51, 69–70 (1987) (―Servicemen
already enjoy greater access to federal relief for most injury than do all other federal
employees; equity does not compel exacerbating this disparity by revoking or limiting
Feres.‖); supra Part IV.B.1.c.
599. See, e.g., United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 610 (1990) (observing that the
power to consent to suits and waive sovereign immunity is ―reserved to Congress‖); United
States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940) (explaining that without the
consent of the sovereign, the ―attempted exercise of judicial power is void‖).
600. See, e.g., United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting United States
v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)).
601. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (citing United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc.,
503 U.S. 30, 33–34, 37 (1992); Irwin v. Dep‘t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990)).
602. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950).
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intended the FTCA to encompass claims arising out of activity incident to
military service.603 Accordingly, because the FTCA does not provide an
applicable waiver, incident-to-service claims are barred by sovereign
immunity.604
Three consequences logically follow from Feres‘ holding that
Congressional enactment of the FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity
for incident-to-service claims. First, the decision is directly applicable only
to the FTCA. Feres is only persuasive authority for other statutes and areas
of law. In explaining its holding, the Feres Court discussed a number of
rationales or factors that supported its conclusion that Congress had not
included incident-to-service claims in the FTCA. These rationales include
the absence of any comparable private person liability,605 the distinctively
federal relationship between service members and the United States,606 the
inappropriateness of using varying state laws to govern that relationship,607
and finally, the compensation system Congress established for military
personnel and the absence of any direction from Congress as to how
moneys from the two remedies would be adjusted.608 Because they proved
useful, these rationales were adopted as reasons counseling hesitation in
recognizing constitutional tort remedies for injuries that arise out of or in
the course of activity incident to military service.609 They were also found
useful in determining whether the Suits in Admiralty Act, the Death on the
High Seas Act, or the Public Vessels Act waive sovereign immunity for
incident-to-service injuries.610 With regard to the Privacy Act, they
correctly were not.611
The second consequence is that the rationales supporting the Court‘s
analysis in Feres are not elements of a defense.612 They are, taken together,
603. See id. at 146.
604. See id.; supra notes 599–603.
605. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 141–42.
606. See id. at 143–44.
607. See id. at 142–43 (noting that soldiers serve in a ―number of places in quick
succession,‖ making the use of geography to determine the selection of law for their tort
claims an imprudent choice).
608. See id. at 144.
609. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683–84 (1987) (quoting Chappell v.
Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983)).
610. Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301-30308 (2006); The Suits in
Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30901-30918 (2006); Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 31101-31113 (2006); Blakey v. U.S.S. Iowa, 991 F.2d 148, 150–52 (4th Cir. 1993)
(adopting the Feres analysis for these statutes); see also Miller v. United States, 42 F.3d
297, 300 (5th Cir. 1995); Charland v. United States, 615 F.2d 508, 509 (9th Cir. 1980);
Beaucoudray v. United States, 490 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
611. See Cummings v. Dep‘t of the Navy, 279 F.3d 1051, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(rejecting a Feres-based argument in a Privacy Act case).
612. See generally Maas v. United States, 94 F.3d 291, 295 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining
that the extent to which the Feres rationales are present in a case does not impact the
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an explanation for the Feres conclusion that Congress did not contemplate
that the FTCA would provide a tort remedy for incident-to-service claims.
But debating whether a particular inquiry will disrupt military discipline or
whether a government contractor is entitled to compensation does not
change the core holding—Congress did not waive sovereign immunity for
tort suits by service members related to military service.613
The third consequence of Feres‘ holding is simple. Because the Court
held that the FTCA is not a waiver of sovereign immunity for incident-toservice claims, federal courts, including the Supreme Court, lack the
authority to modify Feres because they do not have the authority to waive
sovereign immunity.614 The Court does have authority to decide that it had
been mistaken in Feres about what Congress intended and to overturn the
entire doctrine, but successfully and credibly revisiting and reversing such
a legislative interpretation sixty years after the fact would be extremely
difficult.
Certainly Congress can undo Feres, as the Court has repeatedly
recognized.615 Whether it should do so is a matter that might be debated.
While that argument is beyond the scope of this article, a thorough
understanding of the historical and legal backdrop to the FTCA and the
Feres decision would elevate such a debate above the generalities and blind
assumptions that have too frequently been lodged against Feres in the past.

doctrine‘s application); Verma v. United States, 19 F.3d 646, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per
curiam) (―[W]hether or not the circumstances of a case implicate the rationales for the Feres
doctrine, the doctrine bars any damage suit against the United States for injuries incurred
incident to military service.‖).
613. See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 690–92 (1987) (rejecting a test for
liability that would require analyzing Feres rationales); United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S.
52, 58–59 (1985); Stencel Aero Eng‘g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666,
672–73 (1977).
614. See, e.g., United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 610 (1990); United States v. U.S.
Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940).
615. See, e.g., Johnson, 481 U.S. at 686; Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138, 146
(1950).

